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ABSTRACT 
Karina Yuri Ito: The Political Power of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Under the direction of Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo) 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was created in 1969 with the purpose to 
protect and interpret the American Convention on Human Rights and other treaties. Like any 
international court, it lacks traditional measures to enforce its decisions, having to resort to 
the willingness of states to have its judgments fulfilled. In this context, does the Inter-
American Court have political power? What would be the indicators of the effectiveness of 
the Court in fulfilling its mandate? In this research, I rely on the lessons learned from the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights and identify five 
variables which are regarded as evidence of an international court‟s power: compliance with 
judgments, increase in caseload, legal doctrines, supremacy of rulings and domestic courts‟ 
support. I find significant evidence to corroborate the theory that the Inter-American Court 
has political power to apply and improve human rights in the Americas. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized the inherent dignity and the 
equal and inalienable rights of all human beings. Besides establishing a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and nations, it called for progressive measures to ascertain the 
effective recognition and protection of those rights.
1
 Since then, there have been three main 
types of action to make this a reality. Countries have pledged to adjust their national laws to 
conform to this international standard; they have ratified multilateral treaties on the subject; 
and also, more relevant to the purpose of this research, there has been a proliferation of 
agreements in different regions of the world creating international courts to regulate the 
implementation of such rights beyond the state.  
In this context, and recognizing the challenges of protecting human rights in the Americas, 
the Ninth International Conference of American States considered that “no right is genuinely 
assured unless it is safeguarded by a competent court.”2 The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACrtHR) was then created and had its first hearing in 1979. However, like other 
international courts, the IACrtHR lacks traditional mechanisms, such as the ones that national 
                                                             
1 The United Nations. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. Accessed on March 19, 2011. Available from 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml  
 
2
 Organization of the American States. “Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
System (updated to July 2003)”. Accessed on March 19, 2011. Available from 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/libros/Basingl01.pdf  
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courts have, for enforcing its decisions. There are no civil or criminal sanctions for 
disobeying a court order, and there is no police force to regulate behavior. Compelling 
member states to act against their interests and sovereignty can be a challenge, so the 
relevance of international courts is questionable.  
This thesis addresses the question of how effective the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights is in effectively protecting human rights. Given its limited capacity to enforce its 
decisions, does it serve the purposes for which it was created or is it a mere puppet in the 
hands of its member states? How can one measure the power of the Court? 
Hitherto, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the political power of the Inter-
American Court from either the political science or legal perspectives. This is most likely due 
to the fact that the Court is relatively young and like any institution, its presence will take 
time to be consolidated. Moreover, the statistical data provided by the Court enables only a 
superficial analysis of its functioning, making it necessary to open case by case in the search 
for evidence. In this thesis, I resort to the literature on the power of the European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, two tribunals with more years of existence 
and about which there have been extensive research and debate, in order to identify which 
variables are regarded as evidence of an international court‟s power. 
Based on this literature, I analyze five measures that have been used to identify and measure 
the political power of the European international courts: a) compliance with decisions; b) 
increase in caseload; c) legal doctrines which increase cooperation and the court‟s scope; d) 
supremacy of international court‟s rulings over domestic courts‟; and, e) domestic courts‟ 
support. For the purpose of evaluating the power of the IACrtHR, I observed how each of 
 3 
 
these five variables has contributed to the European courts‟ power, and examined whether a 
similar mechanism can be found in the Americas. I relied on the secondary literature, annual 
reports of the courts, available statistical information, as well as contentious cases brought 
before the Inter-American Court by examining all existing complaints, remedies and 
monitoring reports until 2009, a total of 360 documents. 
The research for this thesis uncovered important similarities between the three international 
courts in terms of compliance and increase in caseload. Also, several of the doctrines present 
in the European courts are also present in the Inter-American Court, including the supremacy 
of rulings. Most importantly, I found strong evidence of domestic court support for this 
international Court‟s decisions in a case study involving amnesty laws in the Americas. All 
of these facts attest of the political power of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It 
has not yet acquired the power of its European siblings, but is on its way to achieving it. 
This paper is divided into 5 sections. First, is a brief history of the Inter-American dual 
system of protection of human rights, with a focus on the Court‟s purposes and procedure. I 
will then analyze the literature on the European experience with international courts, the 
measures of political power which have been used therein, and the appropriateness of 
applying the same measures in the Americas. The third part of the paper will focus on the 
power of the Inter-American Court, with an examination of the five proposed variables 
through statistical data and case studies. The fourth part of the paper offers some suggestions 
for the improvement of the Court and the fifth is the conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
II. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 
 
Shocked by the atrocities that plagued the world during World War II and in response to the 
necessity of recognizing and ascertaining certain inner rights pertaining to human nature, in 
1948 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights designed the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR).
 3
 
Eleanor Roosevelt, chairman of the Commission, remarked at the time on the nonbinding 
character of this document that would serve as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations. That meant that in case signatory states did not strive to live up to 
their pledge by adjusting their constitutions or by ratifying the covenants that would follow, 
the rights protected by the Declaration would be unenforceable. For this feature, the UDHR 
received a lot of criticism. However, as Mary Ann Glendon (2001) affirmed “though many 
human rights supporters had had doubts about the effectiveness of a „nonbinding standard‟ 
… ideas are as real as tanks.”4 Indeed, the ideals and principles of a universal standard of 
protection of the rights of all men spread throughout the world.  
                                                             
3 United Nations. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Accessed November 10, 2010.  
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html 
 
4 GLENDON, Mary Ann. A World Made New. Random House: New York, 2001. p.213 
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Human rights were gaining momentum when the inter-American human rights system was 
born in Bogotá, Colombia, in April 1948 at the ninth international conference of American 
states. This gathering produced the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS)
5
 
and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
6
 Then in 1969, the American 
Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica) was adopted recognizing that 
“the essential rights of man are not derived from one's being a national of a certain state, but 
are based upon attributes of the human personality, and that they therefore justify 
international protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or complementing the 
protection provided by the domestic law of the American states.” 7 It also established in Art. 
33 the dual institutional structure of human rights protection in the Americas: the already 
existing Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter IACrtHR or the Court). 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5Organization of American States – Secretariat for Legal Affairs (SLA). “ The Charter of the Organization of 
American States.” Accessed November 10, 2010. http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-
41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm#ch19  
 
6 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.” 
Accessed November 10, 2010. http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/Basic2.American 
percent20Declaration.htm  
 
7 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “American Convention on Human Rights – Pact of San José, 
Costa Rica.” Accessed November 10, 2010. http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/Basic3.American 
percent20Convention.htm  
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The Dual Institutional Structure of the Inter-American Human Rights System 
The IACHR was created in 1959 and held its first session in 1960.
8
 Since then and until 
2009, this permanent  and autonomous body composed of 7 members elected on their 
personal capacity, i.e. not as representatives of their member states, has held 134 sessions, 
carried out 69 on-site visits, received thousands of petitions which resulted in approximately 
14,000 cases, and produced several reports.
9
 
In 1965, the IACHR had its functions and authority broadened by OAS Resolution XXII 
which authorized it to examine petitions related to human rights cases.
10
 The American 
Convention on Human Rights confirmed this power in Art. 44 by determining that “Any 
person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party.” Besides 
individuals and NGOs, state parties might also denounce other state parties‟ violations 
provided that, according to Art. 45, the defendant state recognizes the competence of the 
Commission to examine these claims. 
                                                             
8 The Commission was created before the American Convention on Human Rights which established the Court 
and the dual system.  
 
9 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “What is the IACHR?” Accessed November 10, 2010. 
http://www.cidh.org/what.htm Inter-American Commission on Human Rights “Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.” Chapter II: Legal Bases and Activities of the IACHR during 2009, A – 
Legal Basis, Functions and Powers – 5. Accessed November 11, 2010, 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.II.eng.htm  
 
10 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System” III. The Organs of the Inter-American Human Rights System, A. The, 1. Background and 
Evolution. Accessed November 11, 2010, http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic1. 
percent20Intro.htm  
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According to the IACHR‟s statistical information, more than 13,000 complaints were 
submitted to its appreciation from 1997 to 2009, and this number has been increasing 
gradually.
11
 
So, which states can be challenged by these complaints before the Commission? The OAS 
member states that have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. All 35 
independent states of the Americas have ratified the OAS Charter.
12
 Out of the 35 OAS 
member states, 25 have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. They are: 
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,  Perú, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago (for cases submitted to 
the Court until one year after May 26, 1998, when the state denounced the Convention), 
Uruguay and Venezuela.
13
 
                                                             
11 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “2009 Annual Report.” Total Number of Complaints Received 
by Year. Accessed February 20, 2011. http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.III.eng.htm#B.  
 
12 Organization of the American States. “Member States.” Accessed November 11, 2010, 
http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp   
Honduras was suspended from participation in the system in July 5, 2009 because of the June 28, 2009 Coup 
d’Etat. For more information, please see: Organization of American States. “OAS Suspends Membership of 
Honduras.” July 5, 2009. Accessed February 25, 2011. Available from 
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-219/09  
Cuba was excluded from participation in the OAS in 1962 by 14 votes in favor, 1 against and 6 abstentions. 
Among the reasons why it happened, its Marxism-Leninism was considered incompatible with the purposes of 
the inter-American system. This exclusion was lifted in June 3, 2009. For more information, please see: 
Organization of American States. “Six Report on the Situation of Political Prisoners in Cuba.” December 14, 
1979. Accessed on February 25, 2011. Available from 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Cuba79eng/intro.htm  
 
13
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Status of Ratifications of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.” Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm  
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When the IACHR receives a petition, it has to inform the accused state party, examine the 
admissibility of the claim, verify the facts and propose a friendly settlement on the basis of 
respect for human rights.
14
 If a settlement is not reached, the Commission prepares a report 
on the case and makes recommendations to the defendant state in a first report.
15
 In a period 
of three months after the report is transmitted, three options are available: 
a) Settlement between parties provided that human rights are respected; 
b) The Commission decides by absolute majority of its members if the state has taken 
adequate measures according to its recommendations. A second report might be 
drafted offering the state more time to complete the recommendations.  
c) The case is referred by the Commission to the Inter-American Court. This is only an 
option if the defendant state has recognized the jurisdiction of this Court.
16
 The 
member states of the OAS that have declared its acceptance of the powers of the 
IACrtHR are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,  Perú, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago (for cases 
submitted to the Court until 1 year after May 26, 1998), Uruguay and Venezuela.
17
 
The ratification by the USA of the Convention and its acceptance of the Court‟s jurisdiction 
would offer great support to the Inter-American system of human rights protection. However, 
                                                             
14 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 48 
 
15 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 50 
 
16 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 62 
 
17
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Status of Ratifications of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.” Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm  
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neither of these actions was taken. This is probably due to the American policy of not 
submitting itself to the jurisdiction of any international courts, including the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), and only recognizing the Supreme Court of the United States as the 
highest body to examine claims. The recognition of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American 
Court is viewed as a compromise of sovereignty that the USA is not willing to accept, 
especially in human rights matters following a tradition of Brickerism.
18
 
There have been recent indicators of a possible change in such international policy, at least 
towards the ICC, since secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed that it was a great regret 
that the USA was not a member of such court.
19
 Perhaps this could foster hopes for a future 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The IACrtHR is “an autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is the application and 
interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights.”20 It was established when the 
American Convention on Human Rights entered into force in July 18, 1978 with the 11
th
 
                                                             
18 KARNS, Margaret P. MINGST, Karen A. “The United States and Multilateral Institutions : Patterns of 
Changing Instrumentality and Influence.” Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990. P. 185 
 
19 The Huffington Post. “Clinton suggests US could join International Criminal Court”. Accessed on April 11, 
2011. Available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/06/clinton-suggests-us-could_n_252614.html  
 
20
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, 
Preamble. Accessed November 11, 2010. http://www.cidh.org/basicos/English/Basic19.Statute percent20of 
percent20the percent20IA percent20Court.htm  
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deposit of ratification by Grenada.
21
 It is a non-permanent Court currently holding four 
regular sessions per year, composed of seven judges from the OAS member states and 
located in San José, Costa Rica.
22
 
In order to fulfill its mandate, the Court has three major roles: advisory jurisdiction, 
adjudicatory/ contentious jurisdiction and the ability to issue precautionary or provisional 
measures. Combined they represent the means by which the Court can improve and protect 
human rights in the Americas. 
The first role refers to the power to pronounce its opinion on human rights matters. Any 
member State, organization or any organs of the OAS listed in Chapter X of the Charter may 
consult with the Court on the Convention itself or on any other treaty related to the protection 
of human rights in America. States may even ask the Court to check their domestic laws‟ 
compatibility with other human rights instruments.
23
Exempli gratia, as related to a 
consultation referent to the interpretation of the Convention requested by the IACHR, the 
Court was asked to clarify the question on the exhaustion of domestic remedies in case of 
indigents constrained by economic reasons or fear. The Court concluded that if such 
                                                             
21 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Status of Ratifications of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.” Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm  
 
22 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(2009)”, pp. 1 -2. Accessed November 14, 2010. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf  
 
23 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 64 
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conditions prevented these persons from invoking domestic measures, they were not required 
to exhaust such remedies.
24
 
About the scope of these advisory opinions, the Court, pronouncing on a consultation 
requested by  Perú in September 24, 1982, recognized that “Article 64 of the Convention 
confers on this Court an advisory jurisdiction that is more extensive than that enjoyed by any 
international tribunal in existence today.”25 Following this statement, the IACrtHR proceeded 
to address the  Perúvian question on the how the phrase “other treaties concerning the 
protection of human rights in the American states” should be interpreted. The Court 
concluded that it had the competence to produce advisory opinions ratione materiae which 
involves all treaties about human rights and also ratione personae, or in other words, treaties 
whose party or parties are signatory to the OAS.
26
 
Another interesting feature of the Court is that within its advisory powers, it has secured, by 
means of amici curiae, “a considerable participation by academic institutions, non-
governmental organizations and individuals (…).”27 This demonstrates good will towards 
                                                             
24 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Advisory Opinion OC 11/ 90 of August 10, 1990 – Exceptions to the 
Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46 (1), 46 (2) (a) and 46 (2) (b) American Convention on Human 
Rights”, p. 11. Accessed November 11, 2010, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_11_ing.pdf  
 
25 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Advisory Opinion OC 1/82 of September 24, 1982 – “Other 
Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights)”, p. 4. Accessed November 11, 2010. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_01_ing1.pdf  
 
26 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Advisory Opinion OC 1/82 of September 24, 1982 – “Other 
Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights)”, p. 5. Accessed November 11, 2010. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_01_ing1.pdf 
  
27 TRINDADE, Antonio Augusto Cançado. “The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” in 
HARRIS, David. LIVINGSTONE, Stephen. The Inter-American System of Human Rights. Clarendon Press – 
Oxford. 1998. p. 142. 
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other human rights groups and their opinions. From 1979, when the Court started 
functioning, until 2009, it had produced 20 advisory opinions.
28
 
The second role of the Court is the issuance of provisionary measures to protect persons from 
irreparable damages in case of extreme gravity and urgency.
29
 According to Christian 
Tomuschat (2003), “the Court not only enjoys a competence to take action, but is bound to 
do so.”30  There are two moments in which the Court can perform such task: 
a) When a case is before the Commission, still not under the jurisdiction of the Court. In 
this type of case, the Commission itself requests provisional measures before the 
Court which presumes them to be necessary. For instance, on July, 22, 1997, the 
Court was requested by the Commission to secure the life and the physical integrity 
of the members of the Association of Relatives of Detainees-Disappeared Persons of 
Colombia et al. 
31
 
b) When a case is already pending under the jurisdiction of the Court. For example, in a 
recent decision in the Case of the 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, the Court granted 
                                                             
28 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(2009)”, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, p. 4, accessed November 11, 2010, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf     
 
29 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 63 (2) 
 
30 TOMUSCHAT, Christian. Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003. p.213 
 
31
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Provisional Measures Requested by the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights in the Matter of the Republic of Colombia – Alvares et al. Case.” Accessed November 11, 
2010. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/alvarez_se_01_ing.pdf  
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provisional measures to secure, once again, the right to life and personal integrity of a 
child.
32
 
The number of provisional measures being submitted to the Court has been increasing as it 
will be discussed further in this paper. Out of the 81 provisional measures adopted until 
2009, 38 were being monitored.
33
 These facts, according to the Court‟s former president Mr. 
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade (1998), attest to the development of this institution. 
“The granting of those measures has become an increasingly important aspect of the 
contemporary case-law of the Court, given the emergency relief it has secured and indeed the 
lives it has saved, thus demonstrating clearly the preventive function of the international 
protection of human rights.”34 
The third and last role of the IACrtHR is its adjudicatory or contentious jurisdiction, which 
grants every state party to the American Convention on Human Rights and the IACHR the 
right to submit cases before the Court. As previously mentioned, when petitions are initiated 
by individuals or NGOs, they must be first submitted to the Commission for an initial quasi 
judicial process. The Commission then might refer these cases to the IACrtHR. The alleged 
victims represented by NGOs or individuals have locus standi, i.e. the right to participate in 
all proceedings before the Court, but they lack jus standi, the right to have direct access to 
                                                             
32 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Request for Broadening of Provisional Measures Regarding 
Colombia – Case of the 19 Tradesmen.” Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/comerciantes_se_05_ing.pdf  
 
33 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(2009).” p. 15. Accessed November 14, 2010. Available from 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf  
 
34 TRINDADE, Antonio Augusto Cançado. “The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” in 
HARRIS, David. LIVINGSTONE, Stephen. The Inter-American System of Human Rights. Clarendon Press – 
Oxford. 1998. p. 142. 
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the Court.
35
 To this date, no state has initiated a complaint against another, but 120 cases 
brought by the Commission on behalf of individuals were submitted to the appreciation of 
the IACrtHR. 
Which rights can be invoked before the Court? Art. 64 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights establishes that the IACrtHR has jurisdiction over the human rights present in 
the American Convention and other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the 
American states.
36
 According to the 2009 Report of the IACrtHR, the five most commonly 
violated rights under the Convention present in contentious claims before the Court are: a) 
Art. 1: Obligation to respect the rights and freedoms without discrimination – 113 cases; b) 
Art. 8: Right to a fair trial – 94 cases; c) Art. 25: Right to judicial protection – 93 cases; d) 
Art.5: Right to humane treatment and to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment – 76 cases; e) Right to personal liberty and to be free from arbitrary 
arrest or imprisonment – 56 cases.37 
                                                             
35 TRINDADE, Antonio Augusto Cancado. “El Nuevo Reglamento de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos (2000) y su proyección hacia el futuro: La emancipación del ser humano como sujeto del derecho 
internacional” in TRINDADE, Antonio Augusto Cancado. ROBLES, Manuel E. Ventura. El Futuro de la Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. San José, C.R.: Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Alto 
Comisionado de Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, 2003. p. 103 Accessed November 11, 2010,  
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/libros/Futuro.pdf  
 
36 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 64: “The member states of the Organization may consult the 
Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human 
rights in the American states. Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the 
Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like 
manner consult the Court.” 
 
37 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(2009)”, Inter-American Court of Human Rights. p. 7, accessed November 11, 2010, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf     
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The treaties in the Inter-American system which refer to the protection of human rights are 
the: a) Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; b) Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; c) Protocol to the American Convention to Abolish the Death Penalty; d) Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women; e) Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons; f) Inter-
American Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Persons with 
Disabilities.
38
 Physical integrity is the most commonly disrespected right in American 
Treaties. Out of the 18 articles violated by member states, 8 articles are violations in the 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture - 45 cases; 8 articles are violations 
in the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons - 20 cases; 2 articles 
are the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women - 3 cases.
39
 
When examining these claims, the Court‟s procedures include the following:40 
a) Preliminary Objections: examination of the exhaustion of domestic remedies in case 
of individual human rights violations brought before the Commission 
b) Merits Phase: presentation of the case by parties through written submissions 
c) Public Hearing of Testimony 
                                                             
38 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System.” Last updated on June 30, 2010. http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic.TOC.htm  
 
39 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(2009)”, Inter-American Court of Human Rights. p. 8, accessed November 11, 2010, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf  
 
40 WEISSBRODT, David. DE LA VEGA, Connie. International Human Rights Law – an Introduction. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 2007. p. 331. 
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d) Deliberation in Private 
e) Issuance of an Unappealable Decision 
In case the IACrtHR finds a state party guilty of violating human rights, its decision is final 
and binding i.e. states have the obligation to comply with the decision which is unappealable. 
This is explicitly determined by Art. 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights which 
states that: “A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to 
this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, 
and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Convention.”  
Until the early 90s, the judgments only involved financial compensation for violations. After 
that, the Court started to request other types of obligation from the state such as: 
a) Publicly acknowledge international responsibility; 
b) Offer a public apology; 
c) Publish the decision in Official Gazette, newspaper of national circulation or radio 
broadcast the decision; 
d) Build a monument or name a street, square or park on behalf of victims;  
e) Designate a day in celebration of victims; 
f) Conduct criminal investigations and punish offenders; 
g) Nullify judicial decisions that did not follow the due process of law; 
h) Adapt domestic legislation to international human rights standards; 
i) Create educational courses on human rights violated, usually targeted at offenders; 
j) Reimburse legal costs and fees; 
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k) Pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensations; 
l) Offer scholarships to victims‟ dependents;  
m) Pay medical, psychological and psychiatric care for victims and their dependents; 
Although, in theory, states must comply with the decision, in practice, two options are open. 
States can declare their intent to abide by the decision, or they can declare their refusal to 
comply. 
The first option is set according to Art. 68 (1) of the American Convention on Human Rights 
which determines that “The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.” What this means is that states 
abide in good faith to the principle of pacta sunt servanda by which one complies with the 
obligations one previously agreed to obey.  
After the judgment is passed, states enter the monitoring stage.
41
 Cases are not closed and 
archived until the Court has evidence of full compliance. Of the 120 cases submitted since its 
creation until 2009, 104 are still under the stage of monitoring compliance.
42
  
The second option, refusal to abide by the decisions, constitutes a violation of the obligations 
contracted by the state party. It is contrary to the Inter-American purpose since such is not a 
possibility contemplated on the text of the American Convention on Human Rights. In the 
history of the Court, only two states that have ratified the American Charter on Human 
                                                             
41 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.” Art. 63. Accessed November 11, 2010.  http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/basic20.RulesCourt.pdf  
 
42 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(2009).” p. 11. Accessed November 14, 2010. Available from 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf  
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Rights and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court have publicly declared their refusal to 
comply with the decision: Trinidad and Tobago and  Perú. The former state did so with the 
purpose to retain its right to capital punishment,
43
 and the latter state did so during the 
Fujimori era, in an attempt to avoid compliance with future Court‟s decisions.  
The American Convention on Human Rights only describes how a state can accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 62),
44
 and nowhere in its text does it mention how to renounce 
or withdraw this acceptance. Responding to the  Perúvian attempt, the IACrtHR declared that 
“the only avenue the State has to disengage itself from the Court‟s binding contentious 
jurisdiction is to denounce the Convention as a whole”45 in the form prescribed by its Art. 78, 
i.e. with a one-year notice. Before the denunciation is effective one year after its deposit, the 
state still has to comply with all the obligations it had previously agreed to. In other words, 
the withdrawal from the American Convention is not immediate. “Subsequently, a state 
consenting to the jurisdiction of the IACrtHR remains legally obligated to recognize the 
                                                             
43 Organization of the American States. “American Convention on Human Rights – Pact of San José, Costa Rica” 
– Trinidad and Tobago – Denunciation of May 26, 1998.”  Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html#Trinidad_and_Tobago   
 
44 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 62: “1.    A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of 
ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, 
ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Convention. 2.    Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the 
condition of reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases. It shall be presented to the Secretary 
General of the Organization, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other member states of the Organization 
and to the Secretary of the Court. 3.    The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the 
States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration 
pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement.” 
 
45 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru – Judgment of September 24, 1999 
(Competence).” p. 9. Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_54_ing.pdf  
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Court‟s jurisdiction until the date that the withdrawal becomes effective.”46 Trinidad and 
Tobago eventually denounced the whole Convention on May 26, 1998.
47
  Perú did not go 
that far and, during the government of Valentin Paniagua, returned to the Court‟s 
jurisdiction.
48
  
When a state fails to comply with a Court‟s decision, all the IACrtHR can do, according to 
Art. 65
49
 of the American Convention on Human Rights, is continue monitoring and submit 
its report to the General Assembly of the OAS to discuss cases publicly and use political 
measures to promote obedience. “While there is no provision in the OAS dealing with the 
ultimate sanction of expulsion of a state from the Organization as in the Statute of the 
Council of Europe, the Organization‟s practice with regard to Cuba suggests that there is a de 
facto power to exclude a government which fails to comply with its obligations under the 
Charter, although this is by no means firmly established at law.”50 
 
                                                             
46 CONCEPCION, Natasha Parassram. “The Legal Implications of Trinidad and Tobago’s Withdrawal from the 
American Convention on Human Rights.” American University International Law Review (2001): 847 – 890. p. 
863. 
 
47 Organization of the American States. “American Convention on Human Rights – Pact of San José, Costa Rica” 
– Trinidad and Tobago – Denunciation of May 26, 1998.”  Accessed November 11, 2010. Available from 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html#Trinidad_and_Tobago  
 
48 BURT, Jo-Marie. "Quien habla es terrorista: The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru.” Latin American 
Research Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2006): 32-62. p. 338. 
 
49 American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 65: “To each regular session of the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States the Court shall submit, for the Assembly's consideration, a report on its work 
during the previous year. It shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a state has not complied with its 
judgments, making any pertinent recommendations.” 
 
50 DAVIDSON, Scott. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Aldershot; Brookfield, VT : Dartmouth Publ., 
1997. p. 88 
 
 
 
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
How can the power of courts be measured? If one considers domestic courts, their power is 
based on the efficiency by which they perform the essential functions of conflict resolution, 
social control and lawmaking. National courts base their decisions on domestic laws and 
precedents, and they rely on the support of the state through an enforcement apparatus in the 
form of sanctions, civil and criminal. In simple terms, a violation is found, the judiciary 
passes a judgment, and the fulfillment of the requested obligations is enforced by the state.  
Does this describe international courts? Doubtfully so. In the case of international human 
rights courts, the defendant is not an individual or an organization, but the state itself. 
Conflict resolution needs to take into consideration the interests and expectations of the 
individual who had his rights violated, of the state which failed to protect him, and of the 
court which represents the international community may diverge, making compliance almost 
utopian. Before any social control can be exerted, states need to accept the authority and 
jurisdiction of the international court and be willing to alter their laws to adjust international 
human rights standards. The lawmaking feature of these courts is constrained by power 
politics and the defiance of states in an attempt to preserve their sovereignty.  
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Measuring the political power of international courts is therefore a more complicated 
endeavor. The main difference between domestic courts and international courts is 
enforcement. While national courts count with police force and other measures to implement 
civil and criminal penalties, international ones depend heavily on the willingness of states to 
abide by decisions. Due to the lack of enforcement capacity, they will be perceived as 
powerful based on their ability to prove their credibility to hear cases, to constrain defendants 
to abide by their decisions (no matter how powerful the defendant is or how bitter the order 
might be) and also on the capacity to promote change toward the improvement of human 
rights. The question then is how to make this assessment possible for the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights.  
In order to answer this question, it is useful to examine the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter the ECJ)
51
 and the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the ECHR), 
and then identify the measures of power that could be applied to the IACrtHR. These two 
European tribunals are the closest international courts to the IACrtHR, and their political 
power has been examined and measured. Observing some of the mechanisms through which 
these European international courts established their power can shed light into the Inter-
American case. 
 
 
                                                             
51 The European Court of Justice changed its name to the Court of Justice of the European Union when the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 1, 2009. Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
“PRESS RELEASE No 104/09.” Accessed November 27, 2010. 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-12/cp090104en.pdf  
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The European Experience 
The Inter-American dual system of human rights protection is a very recent one. The 
IACrtHR, started functioning less than three decades ago,
52
 and there is no published analysis 
of its political power. 
The initial question one needs to ask is if the measures of power of the international courts in 
Europe can be transplanted to other parts of the globe.
53
 Is it appropriate to measure the 
power of the IACrtHR by observing the same mechanisms which the literature has used in 
the European international courts? Several characteristics make the European experience 
with international courts a unique one.  It is marked by a tradition of strong liberal 
democracies and the rule of law; European member states share common social, political and 
legal values and also the hopes of economic integration. They have also endured the 
experience of two World Wars. For some authors, the ECJ and the ECHR are not to be used 
as models for other international courts because they owe their “success to the high level of 
political and economic unification among European states.”54 They argue that independent 
tribunals do not lead to political unification. Political unification is what enables independent 
tribunals to excel. According to these authors, in the absence of such unity international 
tribunals have better compliance ratings when they act consistently with the interests of state 
members.   
                                                             
52 The submission of the first three cases happened in 1986. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2009).” p. 6. Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf   
 
53 HELFER, Laurence H. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Nov., 1997): 273-391. p. 277 
 
54 POSNER, Eric A. YOO, John C. “Judicial Independence in International Tribunals.” California Law Review, Vol. 
93, No. 1 (Jan., 2005): 1-74. p. 3 
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In spite of that, a great part of the literature contends that “European tribunals have been at 
least the partial architects of their own success and that their experience can form the basis of 
a potentially universalizable model. What is needed is a theory of effective supranational 
adjudication, an effort to isolate the various factors that have contributed to the European 
success story and to identify those that can be replicated beyond Europe.”55  
Despite the many differences that these three courts, the ECJ, the ECHR and the IACrtHR 
have, not to mention the fact that the OAS and the EU can hardly be comparable in terms of 
regional organization, there are many similarities among the two European international 
courts and the IACrtHR which justify having the European experience as a reference. The 
Inter-American Court, like the ECHR, is in a position of hierarchy related to domestic courts. 
Neither of these human rights tribunals can communicate directly with national courts.
56
 All 
three international courts are supranational actors which lack enforcement powers and 
depend on the goodwill of member states to have their decision enforced.
57
 All of these 
courts struggle with imperfect compliance. 
                                                             
55 HELFER, Laurence H. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Nov., 1997): 273-391. p. 278. Also, see ALTER (1998), MOWBRAY (2005), 
ALTER AND HELFER (2010) 
 
56 European Commission. “Treaty of Rome.” Art. 177: (…) Where such a question is raised before any court or 
tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is 
necessary to enable it to give judgement, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such 
question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice. Accessed on March 03, 2011. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf  
 
57 HELFER, Laurence R. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Nov., 1997): 273-391. p. 299 
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Also, by looking at the history of these three international courts, one will notice that before 
the ECHR or the IACrtHR were created, the only international permanent court dealing with 
the protection of human rights was the ECJ. When the ECHR was created in 1950,
58
 cases 
were submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights before they reached it, a 
similar system as the one existing now in the Americas.  The ECJ now uses the decisions of 
the ECHR as guidance. 
Further, the inter-American system of protection of human rights was inspired by the existing 
model in Europe. René Cassin, father of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and one 
of the legal experts who helped draft the American Convention on Human Rights, 
“exemplified the methods and virtues of a genuine comparison of the systems, not only 
sharing the accumulated wisdom of his own experience but also engaging in a self-reflective 
criticism based on his encounter with a different reality as well.”59 As it can be observed, the 
American Convention on Human Rights has European DNA, and so does the Inter-American 
Court. 
 
 
 
                                                             
58 The ECHR was created in November 4, 1950 by the European Convention on Human Rights and had its first 
session in February 1959. The Court would become permanent in November 1, 1998, with the introduction of 
Protocol 11 to the Convention. European Court of Human Rights. “European Court of Human Rights in Brief.” 
Accessed November 26, 2010. http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-
404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure_EN_Portes_ouvertes.pdf  
 
59 CAROZZA, Paolo. “Fifty Years of the European Court of Human Rights viewed by Its Fellow International 
Courts.”  Speech delivered in celebration of the 50
th
 anniversary of the European Court of Human Rights in 
January 30, 2009. Accessed February 17, 2011. Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/3B662702-
FFDB-4187-AAC5-6B926725DF35/0/30012009PresidentCarozzaSeminar_eng_.pdf 
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Measures of Political Power of International Courts 
In addition to the question of the appropriateness of extending the European experience to 
other parts of the world, there are also questions about how the power of international courts 
can be perceived and which variables account for this success. These discussions will serve 
as a reference for the discussion of the power of the IACrtHR. 
According to the more legalist doctrine, power is a matter of compliance. If statistics reflect 
the fulfillment of the judgments, there is effectiveness and the international court is relevant. 
But what if full compliance is still missing?  Is the international court completely devoid of 
power if it lacks high compliance?  
If one is to measure power through compliance alone, none of these three international 
courts, the ECJ, the ECHR or the IACrtHR can be considered powerful simply because there 
is no such a thing as perfect compliance in international courts. Rationally, why would 
member states abide by every single decision enacted by these international courts when it 
involves compromising their understanding of sovereignty and adopting laws and policies 
that go against their interests? There is no clear sanction for partial compliance with 
decisions allowing member states to be at the monitoring stage indefinitely. 
The fact is that even when such ideal rates of compliance are missing, an international court 
can be considered powerful. For instance, even if compliance with the decisions of the ECJ is 
far from perfect, it is considered powerful because inter alia “a surprising large number of 
adverse ECJ decisions are followed by national governments.” 60 Accordingly, conflating the 
                                                             
60 GARRETT, Geoffrey. “The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union.” International Organization, 
Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter, 1995): 171-181. p. 174 
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effectiveness of international courts with compliance ratings alone is a gross mistake. As 
Helfer and Slaughter (2005) note, the “fundamental problem of relying on compliance as an 
indicator of effectiveness is that it fails to consider the nature of the commitments that states 
have asked the tribunal to police.”61 Undoubtedly, if numbers reveal massive compliance 
with an international court‟s decision, this shall not be considered as a negative factor when 
measuring power. However, simply observing the number of decisions fulfilled does not say 
much about how such courts achieved such results or why states chose to abide by its 
decisions. The changes that a judgment requests a member state to implement might not be as 
demanding as one might expect (e.g. monetary compensation or public apology). 
Thus, an international court‟s power has to be measured in terms of effective adjudication i.e. 
the “power to compel a party to a dispute to defend against a plaintiff‟s complaint and to 
comply with the resulting judgment.”62 As one can observe, this analysis is based on the 
perception people have of the tribunal and also the tools it has to bring positive change. It is 
indeed the result of a combination of a number of legal, political, social and cultural factors 
pushing for the protection and improvement of human rights. 
Besides compliance, the literature indicates that several factors have contributed to the 
enhancement of the political power of the ECJ and the ECHR. The level of proficiency of 
jurists, their independence, incrementalism (or the ability to build on previous cases), regime 
                                                             
61 HELFER, Laurence R. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to 
Professors Posner and Yoo.” California Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 3 (May, 2005): 899-956. p. 918 
 
62 HELFER, Laurence H. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Nov., 1997): 273-391. p. 284 
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type and common legal traditions are examples of these factors.
63
 Among them, four emerge 
as having more leverage in accounting for the political power of international courts. They 
are:  
a) Increase in caseload: No international court, no matter how well equipped or funded, 
can survive without cases. They are a reflection of these tribunals‟ legitimacy64, so an 
increase in the caseload does not only mean an increase in the number of violations 
which happen in a member state, but more important, an increase in the trust placed 
upon their authority and efficiency. 
b) Legal doctrines which enhance cooperation and increase the court‟s scope: Legal 
doctrines created and enforced by the ECJ and the ECHR served to establish the 
scope of their power and to motivate compliance. The doctrine of direct effect and the 
doctrine of EC law supremacy, paved the path to a uniform rule of law in Europe. 
According to the first doctrine, EC law creates rights for individuals everywhere in 
Europe, which can be claimed in domestic courts. The second doctrine prohibits 
national governments from applying domestic laws which are contrary to EC law.
65
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of proportionality offered 
European states a chance to improve human rights by having cultural and political 
aspects taken into consideration. 
                                                             
63 HELFER, Laurence H. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Nov., 1997): 273-391. p. 300 – 336 
 
64 HELFER, Laurence H. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Nov., 1997): 273-391. p. 301 
 
65
 ALTER. Karen J. “The European Court’s Political Power: The Emergence if an Authoritative International 
Court in the European Union.” 1996. in ALTER, Karen J. The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays. 
Oxford; New York : Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 93 
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c) Supremacy of international courts‟ rulings over domestic courts. 
d) Support by domestic courts: National courts have become the greatest advocates for 
the ECJ and the reaffirmation of their rulings in the national arena consolidated the 
principles and reasoning therein. “Disobeying an ECJ decision now meant disobeying 
national courts, and all the enforcement power of the national courts could be used in 
the enforcement of EC law.”66 
The examination about compliance and these four factors are the main means through which 
the power of European international courts can be assessed. These factors will guide this 
research in evaluating if the IACrtHR has political power. 
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 ALTER. Karen J. “The European Court’s Political Power: The Emergence if an Authoritative International 
Court in the European Union.” 1996. in ALTER, Karen J. The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays. 
Oxford; New York : Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 94 
 
 
 
 
IV. THE POWER OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
Even if compliance is not perfect, an international court can nevertheless be powerful. 
According to Helfer and Slaughter (1997), “over the past few decades, it has become 
increasingly clear that the ECJ and the ECHR have convinced national governments, 
individual litigants, and the European public to endorse and participate in frequent and often 
high-stakes adjudication at a level above the nation-state”67.  
Other authors agree that European courts have leverage in constraining behavior and bringing 
change in spite of member states‟ wishes. I argue that the IACrtHR is crafting its political 
power through some of the same means that their European siblings have. To observe if this 
is the case, I will assess the power of the Inter-American Court by some of the standards 
applied to the European international courts. If variables such as caseload increase, legal 
doctrines which affirm and enhance the scope of the international court, supremacy of 
decisions and domestic courts‟ support can be observed in the IACrtHR, then this 
international court may not yet have the same status as the European ones, but it has the 
potential to achieve it.  
                                                             
67 HELFER, Laurence R. SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication.” 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Nov., 1997): 273-391. p. 276 
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First, if the caseload of the Inter-American Court has been increasing, especially in the 
exercise of its contentious jurisdiction, it is because individuals and NGOs perceive this 
tribunal as legitimate for hearing their claims, producing a fair decision and constraining the 
behavior of member states. If the IACrtHR has been regarded as an improper and powerless 
venue to have rights enforced, the caseload will reflect it and decrease. 
Second, if the IACrtHR produces doctrines which enhance the scope of their power and at 
the same time encourage compliance by being considerate of member states‟ cultural and 
political situations, it is affirming its authority. Each of these doctrines reveals a facet of the 
Court‟s philosophy and consolidates its scope. These doctrines are means through which the 
IACrtHR is engineering its power acquisition.  
Third, if the IACrtHR‟s rulings are superior to national rulings, it affirms a hierarchy among 
courts and the superiority of the international one over sovereign national supreme courts. 
This fact not only assures legal safety to human rights, but has a means to place the 
protection of human beings under a uniform standard. It is indeed recognition of the authority 
of the Court as the supreme interpreter of laws, and of human rights as beyond the scope of 
obstacles of sovereignty. 
Finally, if domestic courts embrace this international court‟s decisions, they not only reaffirm 
the superiority of the IACrtHR, but also consolidate that uniform view on how to interpret 
and improve human rights. The change in law and policy then comes from within the 
member states themselves, which institutionalize the model decision at a national level, 
where orders can be enforced through civil and criminal penalties. 
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These four variables are ways to assess the Court‟s ability to build its power and pave the 
path for better compliance. 
 
Compliance at the IACrtHR 
As discussed, a first way to assess the power of international courts is to examine compliance 
ratings in the European courts to observe the extent to which they owe their success to these 
numbers. The reality is that nor the ECJ neither the ECHR count with perfect compliance.
68
 
In the ECJ, from 1952 to 2009, 3420 actions were taken for member state failure to fulfill its 
obligations. Italy leads the non-compliance ratings with 615 cases, followed by France with 
389 cases and Greece with 365 cases.
69
  I could find no information on the number of 
decisions passed by the court per year and by country. 
The statistical information provided by the ECHR‟s Annual Report in 2009 divides the 
numbers into pre-1998 and post-1998. This is due to the fact that until this year, contentious 
cases, like in the Americas, had to be submitted to the commission which had the power to 
decide if it should be sent to the ECHR. From 1999 on, according to Protocol 11, the 
                                                             
68 For more information, please see:  Court of Justice of the European Communities. “Annual Report of the 
Court of Justice 2009.” p. 107. Accessed February 17, 2011.  
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/ra09_stat_cour_final_en.pdf  Also the 
European Court of Human Rights. “Annual Report of the European Court of human Rights 2010 (provisional 
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69Court of Justice of the European Union. “Statistics of Judicial Activity of the Court of Justice 2009”, p. 107. 
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Commission continued active for its remaining powers, but petitions started being submitted 
directly to the ECHR.  
The ECHR does not offer complete information on compliance statistics
70
 leading critics to 
assert that it needs to “better monitor the execution of its judgments.”71 Data on the execution 
of judgments of the ECHR is only available since 2007.
72
 What can be obtained from the 
Annual Reports of the ECHR and its Survey of Activities are the total numbers of judgments 
per country, and the state of execution of cases as of December 17, 2010.
73
 
Although there is a lack of systematic evidence, most scholars agree that the compliance 
levels of the European courts is high.
74
 Perhaps this is due to the fact that during the initial 40 
years of activity of the ECHR, if a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
was found, the court “had no power to quash the decisions of the national authorities or to 
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order consequential measures.”75 The only remedies it could award were less demanding 
obligations such as financial compensations for damages and reimbursement of court costs 
and fees, at the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. According to a quantitative study 
performed by Zorn and Winkle (2000),
76
 between 1960 an 1994, the ECHR examined 445 
cases of which 292 violations of the European Convention on Human Rights were found (66 
percent). Out of these 292 cases, in only 48 (16.4percent) were actions initiated for 
noncompliance. That reveals an impressive 83.6percent of compliance with judgments, at 
least until Protocol 11. 
Other studies present opposite results, such as the one by Posner and Yoo (2005), who 
criticize the existing data as unreliable. According to these authors, in the ECJ‟s case, 
noncompliance is difficult to assess because countries tend to conceal disobedience
77
. 
Besides that, out of the 1000 petitions brought before the ECHR until 1999, only in 294 cases 
was domestic law changed
78
. 
Compliance numbers in Europe, as revealed by such studies and annual reports, is relative. If 
only financial compensations are taken into consideration, the ECJ and the ECHR count with 
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massive obedience by member states. When domestic law change is examined, the support 
diminishes. 
What is compliance like in the Inter-American Court? Chart 1, constructed from data in the 
Inter-American Court‟s annual reports,79 shows the number of contentious cases per country, 
referred by the Commission to the Court until 2009. The black bars are the number of cases 
being monitored. The grey bars are the number of cases closed and archived. 
 
Chart 1 
  
Out of the 16 cases that were closed and archived, five were dismissed for being groundless. 
Out of the 11 remaining cases, only three required the state to change domestic law and none 
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required further criminal investigation.
80
Chile is responsible for two of the domestic law 
change cases: one involved access to information and the other censorship.
81
 Nicaragua is 
responsible for the other one in a case that involved indigenous property rights.
82
 
As one can observe, the three states with the highest number of claims before the Court are:  
Perú with 26 cases; Guatemala with 13 cases and Colombia with 10 cases. These are also the 
countries with the worst rates of compliance. Guatemala and Colombia have not fully 
complied with any of the judgments passed against them.  Perú has one case closed and 
archived, but it was due to dismissal.  
So why does  Perú top the list of countries with the highest number of cases before the 
Court? One explanation which can be given is related to time. The country ratified the 
Convention in 1978 and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 1981. The conflict with the 
government‟s death squad and ethnic groups happened from 1980 to 2000, so ratione 
temporis, the Court has the ability to examine cases which happened during the peak of 
atrocities in  Perúvian history. This is unlike in other Latin American states, which ratified 
the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court years after their dictatorships or 
conflicts were over. 
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The states with the lowest number of cases before the Court are: Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic and Haiti, each with one case; Barbados, Bolivia, El Salvador and Trinidad and 
Tobago, each with two cases. Both states with the highest number of cases and states with the 
lowest number of cases before the Court have a zero rate of full compliance with judgments 
passed. 
If one is to analyze closure due to either dismissal or full compliance, the highest number of 
cases are the ones in which Honduras was a defendant – three cases archived, followed by 
Chile, Nicaragua and Suriname – two cases each. If closure is observed in terms of 
proportion of cases archived per cases submitted to the Court, Nicaragua has the best record 
with two-thirds of its cases closed. It is followed by Chile and Suriname with 50percent of 
cases closed. Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Mexico and  Perú were the defendants in the 5 
dismissed cases. All the others were fully complied with the Court‟s decision, which shows 
that Nicaragua, Chile and Suriname are the three most successful cases when compliance is 
measured.  
Due to the fact that a case is not closed until the entire decision has been fulfilled, it is 
important to observe which parts of the decisions have been complied with. The 104 cases 
still under monitoring have parts which have been satisfied and observing the decision in 
parts can offer a more accurate account of the stage of compliance before the IACrtHR. In 
general, states are reluctant to change national legislation and conduct criminal investigations 
and trials, two features of the judgment which could potentially bring change not only to the 
direct victims, but to the whole nation. Public apologies, reimbursement of judicial costs and 
fees and payment of pecuniary and non pecuniary damages are usually the first parts of the 
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decision to be fulfilled. According to the 2009 Annual Report of the IACrtHR, 81 of the costs 
and expenses requested have been fully or partially complied with. 83 percent of the 
indemnizations have been totally or partially fulfilled
83
. Is compliance found in the 
IACrtHR? Just like in Europe, it depends on which part of the judgment one is referring to.  
What‟s crucial for this research is that European courts are considered powerful and 
successful in spite of the inflated numbers or the lack thereof.
84
 This leads to the conclusion 
that the power of international courts, or more specifically the IACrtHR, is not simply a 
function of compliance statistics. Other variables account for the Inter-American situation 
such as the ones which will be discussed below. 
 
The Caseload of the IACrtHR 
As previously mentioned, the IACrtHR has three major mandates: advisory jurisdiction, 
adjudicatory/ contentious jurisdiction and the competence to issue precautionary or 
provisional measures. An increase in the caseload of all three aforementioned areas 
demonstrates an increase in the credibility of the Court. Credibility is not only a reflection of 
how the IACrtHR is perceived by the public, but also a measure of its power. 
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Advisory Opinions 
An increase the demand for advisory jurisdiction proves that member states are willing to use 
the Court‟s understanding of human rights as an interpretation to be applied in either 
controversial or general matters. These states have the option and discretion to request the 
Court‟s opinion or not, and the very fact that they choose to do so can be regarded as 
evidence of the political power of the Court. It also demonstrates that civil society places its 
trust in the rationale offered by the Court. 
The European experience with advisory opinions is small. From 1953 until 2009, the ECJ 
which has “the power to interpret European Union law at the request of national courts”85 
only issued 19 opinions.
86
 The ECHR has since 1970
87
 only been requested to produce three 
advisory opinions, which according to Art. 47 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
can only be provided at the request of the Committee of Ministers.
88
 Out of the three 
requests, only two were found admissible and delivered in 2008 and 2010.
89
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In the Americas, any member State, organization or any organs of the OAS listed in Chapter 
X of the Charter may consult with the Court on the Convention itself or on any other treaty 
related to the protection of human rights in the continent. According to Thomas Buergenthal 
(1985), advisory opinions “by their very nature do not stigmatize the state as a lawbreaker 
and permit a delinquent government to make its compliance appear to be a voluntary act.”90  
Similar to the European experience, from 1982 until 2009, mere 21 advisory opinions were 
requested from the IACrtHR. These requests have not been increasing over time, but instead, 
they have been quite unstable as Chart 2 demonstrates: 
Chart 2 
 
Source: Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2009)”, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, p. 13, accessed January 28, 2011, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf   
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In neither cases presented are international courts gaining more credibility because of their 
advisory jurisdiction. This is mainly because as time passes, the rights protected by human 
rights conventions and their correct interpretation become institutionalized in the state 
parties. Only in very controversial matters will these states feel the necessity to consult with 
international courts. If the caseload of advisory opinions increased over time, one would have 
to wonder why there is such a demand for clarification in interpreting laws according to 
human rights treaties. Overall, the demand in advisory opinions, although important to be 
observed, is not the most relevant jurisdiction in informing about the credibility of the Court. 
 
Provisional Measures 
Provisional measures are intended to prevent irreparable damages to persons in case of 
extreme gravity and urgency
91
. They are similar to injunctions, and grant temporary relief 
until a final decision can be reached by a court. 
In the ECJ, such instruments are called Interim Measures. These “seek suspension of the 
operation of measures which an institution has adopted and which form the subject-matter of 
an action, or any other interim order necessary to prevent serious and irreparable damage to a 
party.”92 The total number of applications for Interim Measures before the ECJ increased 
from the beginning of its operations until the end of the 1980‟s. There were 11 interim 
measures issued by the ECJ in the 1950‟s, 25 in the 1960‟s, 47 in the 1970‟s, 178 in the 
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1980‟s. The numbers decreased during the 1990‟s until the last statistical report in 2009. In 
the 1990‟s, there were 57 interim measures issued by the ECJ, and from 2000 to 2009, only 
31.
93
 Perhaps this is due to the fact that EU law and jurisprudence has consolidated after 
initial years of the functioning of the ECJ and only a few new issues are left in need for 
Interim Measures which cannot be offered by domestic courts. 
An amendment by the ECHR in its rules in July 4, 2005 introduced Rule 39 which allows the 
Chamber or the President, at the request of a party or any other persons concerned, to offer 
Interim Measures.
94
 In its 2005 Annual Report, the ECHR justified the introduction of this 
jurisdiction by referring to decisions by the International Court of Justice, the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations and, more impressively, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. Building on these tribunals‟ work, the ECHR reviewed its previous 
jurisprudence in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey.
95
 The number of applications for these 
measures has increased since then. In 2007, 262 measures were granted; 2008, 747; 2009, 
654; and in 2010 it reached its peak at 1440.
96
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The IACrtHR also has the power to concede Provisional Measures at the request of the 
Commission, before the case is brought to its judicial appreciation. In 2009, 10 provisional 
measures were requested. Out of 10, six were granted, two were rejected and two other were 
pending a decision 
Chart 3 
 
Source: Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2009)”, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, p. 14, accessed January 28, 2011, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf   
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In general there has been an increase in the number of provisional measures requested before 
the Court. Out of the 96 submissions until 2009, 38 were still active and being monitored.
97
 
What does the experience of the IACrtHR with these measures reveal? 
One of the most important findings one can obtain from an analysis of the Interim/ 
Provisional Measures is that the American experience with them has been so relevant for the 
protection of rights that it has motivated the ECHR to adopt them through Rule 39. When the 
European court broadened its mandate it cited a previous recognition by the IACrtHR. 
Another conclusion is that interim measures offer credibility to the power of the IACrtHR, 
which is not limited to issuing only final decisions, but has the ability to protect human rights 
while such are impending. An increase in usage of these measures means that the Court is 
increasingly assuring the people in the Americas that urgent reparations are not a simple 
possibility, but a reality. 
 
Adjudicatory/ Contentious Jurisdiction 
Adjudicatory/ Contentious jurisdiction is the most important mandate of any court. It refers 
to the ability to solve disputes between a plaintiff and a defendant, and restore the injured 
party. In human rights matters, international courts can not only extend a hand to injured 
plaintiffs, but also request the defendant states to correct their behavior and prevent future 
infractions from happening. 
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The usage of contentious jurisdiction by European international courts has been increasing 
with time. The contentious jurisdiction of the ECJ is measured by the number of direct 
actions which has continued to boost since the beginning of its activities.
98
 It started at mere 
four applications in 1953, and during the 1950‟s, this court examined a total of 142 actions. 
This number increased in the 1960‟s to 407, in the 1970‟s to 1892 and in the 1980‟s to 2213. 
In the 90‟s the number decreased to 1773, but increased again from 2000 to 2009 to 2038.99 
Likewise, the number of applications allocated to a judicial formation in the ECHR has also 
been increasing from 8,400 in 1999 to a peak of 61,300 in 2010.
100
  
If the ECHR is to be observed when it worked under the same Inter-American dual system, 
one needs to take into consideration the first years of activity of the ECHR. According to the 
Survey of Forty Years of Activity of the ECHR, from 1959 until 1998, there were 45,000 
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applications allotted to a judicial formation before the commission, of which this court 
delivered 837 judgments.
101
  
Since the IACrtHR started functioning until 2009, it has judged 120 contentious cases, and 
the number of submissions has increased according to Chart 4: 
Chart 4 
 
Source: Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2009)”, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, p. 6, accessed January 28, 2011, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf   
By comparing the first years of functioning of the ECJ, the ECHR and the IACrtHR, one will 
observe similar patterns of increase. A shy rise in the first decade, followed by a non-
constant but strong one in the following years. What do these numbers reveal? 
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The increase in the number of cases being submitted to the IACrtHR reflects an increase in 
the number of cases brought before the Inter-American Commission.
102
 Due to the fact that 
the IACrtHR is a Court of last resort, the conclusions one can make are that: a) Human rights 
protection by the law of member states is insufficient, which leads individuals to recourse to 
this Court; b) Domestic courts sometimes are not enough to grant rights to citizens or they 
rule in a different manner than the IACrtHR considers proper; c) the people in the Americas 
have come to trust the IACrtHR as an efficient venue to have their human rights fulfilled.  
It may be possible that all of these conclusions are correlated with the increase in caseload of 
the Court. However, the last conclusion is the most important if one is looking for evidence 
of the credibility of the Court. If trust on the IACrtHR was considered to be lacking thereof, 
individuals and NGOs would not be increasing the use of this channel to promote the 
protection of rights. The lack of human rights protection in member states or the inefficiency 
of their domestic courts cannot alone motivate plaintiffs to bring cases before the 
Commission and then the Court. The rise in the number of contentious cases shows that the 
IACrtHR is perceived as an authoritative and legitimate venue to find justice. 
The increase in the number of advisory opinions, provisional measures and contentious cases 
by the IACrtHR follows a similar pattern as the ones in the ECJ and the ECHR. Although the 
number of advisory opinions has not increased, the number of provisional measures and also 
the number of contentious cases has increased. If an increase in the caseload of European 
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Courts is perceived as a positive factor in the perception of effective of those tribunals, the 
same can be said about the IACrtHR.  
 
Doctrines and Landmark Cases 
 
ECJ Doctrines and Landmark Cases 
The success of the ECJ as a supranational court is due, in great part, to its own efforts, 
despite of the desires of member states.
103
 These efforts are evident in the consolidation 
process of two main doctrines enforced by the ECJ: The doctrine of direct effect of EU Law 
and the doctrine of supremacy of EU Law which were affirmed and reaffirmed through a 
number of landmark decisions. 
In deciding a case known as Van Gend and Loos in 1963, the ECJ established the doctrine of 
direct effect. The issue involved the proper application of Art. 12 of the Treaty of Rome 
which prohibits member states from introducing “any new customs duties on imports or 
exports or any charges having equivalent effect, and from increasing those which they 
already apply in their trade with each other.”104  The Court ruled that such article was 
“applicable without any preliminary incorporation in the national legislation of Member 
States (…) Infringement of it adversely affects the fundamental principles of the Community, 
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and individuals as well as the Community must be protected against such infringements.”105 
Besides clarifying the scope of the law, this decision “made the Treaty of Rome a 
constitutional document that created immediately enforceable rights for private actors and 
higher-order legal obligations for governments.”106 It is a great conquest for mankind when 
international human rights can be claimed in national courts, which possess enforcement 
mechanisms that go beyond mere reliance on cooperation.  
In 1964, in Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, the ECJ once again produced a groundbreaking 
decision in the issue of compatibility of national laws with the Treaty of Rome. It determined 
that community law has precedence over national law. According to the understanding of the 
Court, “this provision, which is subject to no reservation, would be quite meaningless if a 
State could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a legislative measure which could 
prevail over Community law.”107  
The two decisions described above mark the birth of the doctrines of direct effect and the 
doctrine of EU law supremacy. They establish the supremacy of EU law over domestic law 
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and the ECJ as the supreme court to dictate its application. These doctrines were later 
confirmed in several other decisions.
108
  
Why did member states not push to reverse the two aforementioned doctrines and blocked 
national courts from enforcing decisions against their interest? Did they ever notice the threat 
that was being institutionalized against their sovereignty? In fact, they did. Alter (1998) notes 
that in the early years of the EU, whenever an unwanted legal decision was made, national 
politicians tried to find a way to circumvent it through extralegal means. “They asserted the 
illegitimacy of the decisions in a battle for political legitimacy at home, instructed national 
administrations to ignore ECJ jurisprudence, or interpreted away any difference between EC 
law and national policy.”109 However, the moment that national courts started enforcing 
ECJ‟s jurisprudence, those avenues no longer worked.  
It is through these doctrines, more specifically their consolidation in landmark cases and the 
support by national courts that the political power of the ECJ was solidified.  
 
ECHR Doctrines and Landmark Cases 
The ECHR did not adopt the doctrine of direct effect or the doctrine of supremacy of 
European Convention. According to Carl Lebeck (2007), “The absence of any direct effect 
has been a way to avoid conflicts between domestic legal systems and the requirements of 
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the European Convention on Human Rights.”110 Moreover, the Court‟s website informs that 
because the Convention has been incorporated into national law, domestic courts must 
support and apply this Law, otherwise, “the European Court of Human Rights would find 
against the State in the event of complaints by individuals about failure to protect their 
rights.”111 This accountability by the ECHR is performed through the Margin of Appreciation 
doctrine and the Proportionality doctrine. 
The Margin of Appreciation refers to “the latitude a government enjoys in evaluating factual 
situations and in applying the provisions enumerated in international human rights 
treaties.”112 It takes into consideration the particularities of a member state, its culture, 
traditions and political situation when applying European human rights standards.
113
 
In 1976, the ECHR confirmed this doctrine in a decision in Handyside v. UK, a case which 
involved censorship in a children‟s book and freedom of expression. The Court pronounced: 
“The domestic margin of appreciation (…) goes hand in hand with a European supervision. 
Such supervision concerns both the aim of the measure challenged and its necessity; it covers 
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not only the basic legislation but also the decision applying it, even one given by an 
independent court.”114 
By affirming the margin of appreciation, the ECHR is offering member states a range within 
which the application of human rights will be acceptable. This reflects its understanding and 
tolerance of cultural diversity at the same time it lures member states to slowly adapt to the 
European standard. By offering flexibility in the enforcement of human rights, the court is 
encouraging compliance. What can be viewed as lenience to some may be a demonstration of 
this court‟s attempt to attract support.  
The Doctrine of Proportionality refers to the balance that must exist between the rights of an 
individual and the interests of the community. According to this principle, guaranteeing a 
human right to a person involves considering him as part of a society to which he belongs. It 
was implicitly mentioned in the first judgment of the ECHR – Lawless v. Ireland, and then 
explicitly in the Belgian Linguistic case, in Handyside v. UK and in Sunday Times v. UK.
115
  
The Sunday Times case involved freedom of expression. The famous newspaper published a 
number of articles informing the public of a marketed drug which had caused deformation in 
babies. The attorney-general of the UK obtained an injunction to block the publications and 
stop the results of the research from being disseminated. The newspaper presented its claim 
before the ECHR which decided that the social need in the matter was not “sufficiently 
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pressing to outweight the public interest in freedom of expression.”116 In other words, the 
potential negative effects of the publication of the article were not enough to justify a 
constraint in the right to freedom of expression. 
The doctrine of proportionality reflects a relative tolerance of the ECHR in terms of granting 
fundamental rights to individuals vis à vis the social interest. It understands that there is a 
greater scenario to be considered in the protection of human rights. By being proportional, 
this court is demonstrating that once again it is taking social imperatives within a member 
state into consideration.  
 
IACrtHR Doctrines and Landmark Cases 
Can these European doctrines or similar ones be found within the IACrtHR? Their presence 
can demonstrate that the Inter-American Court is attempting to consolidate its power through 
similar avenues to the ones used in Europe. 
 
 The IACrtHR and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
In 1984, Costa Rica asked the Inter-American Court for an advisory opinion on proposed 
amendments to provisions of naturalization in its constitution. The member state wanted the 
Court‟s opinion on the compatibility between the amendments and the American Convention 
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on Human Rights, especially Art. 29 which prohibits the restriction of the enjoyment and 
exercise of human rights. 
The Court affirmed in its advisory opinion OC-4/84 regarding amendments to the 
naturalization provision of the Constitution of Cost Rica, that “it is possible to identify 
circumstances in which considerations of public welfare may justify departures to a greater 
or lesser degree from the standards articulated (…). One is here dealing with values which 
take on concrete dimensions in the face of those real situations in which they have to be 
applied and which permit in each case a certain margin of appreciation in giving expression 
to them.”117 
The IACrtHR explicitly incorporated the margin of appreciation doctrine. It declared in the 
above case that states did enjoy this margin when deciding on matters of the acquisition of 
nationality
118
 and concluded that the amendments in question did not violate the Convention 
and did not constitute discrimination. 
Just like in the European case, this demonstrates the flexibility of the IACrtHR in producing 
decisions and jurisprudence which offer the member state a margin within which their 
compliance can be considered acceptable. This recognition is encouraging and reflects a 
maneuver used by the Court to attract obedience. 
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 The IACrtHR and the Doctrine of Proportionality 
According to Yutaka Arai-Takahashi (2002), the doctrine of proportionality was implicitly 
incorporated into limitation clauses in the American Convention on Human Rights. 
According to these clauses, restrictions on the exercise of human rights can only be permitted 
to justify legitimate public purposes.
119
  
In 1985, the government of Costa Rica once again asked the Court to produce an advisory 
opinion on the issue of compulsory membership prescribed by law in order to practice 
journalism. The Court did not mention the concept of proportionality explicitly, but in 
examining the matter, it considered that the restrictions on freedom of expression must be 
necessary to ensure certain legitimate goals, and not simply useful
120
. It then decided that the 
compulsory licensing of journalists was in violation of Art. 13 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights. 
In determining if the full exercise of a certain human right can be compromised, the Court 
considered both the individual right and the social imperative in asserting it. Proportionality 
is a demonstration of the IACrtHR‟s broad understanding of the necessity to protect 
individual human rights given the collective interest. 
 
 
                                                             
119 ARAI-TAKAHASHI, Yutaka. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR. New York: Intersentia, 2002. p. 186 
 
120 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13th, 1985.” Paragraph 79, 
p. 22. Accessed February 5, 2011. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_05_ing.pdf  
 55 
 
 The IACrtHR and the Duty to Punish Doctrine 
The doctrine of direct effect, just like in the ECHR, was not incorporated by the Inter-
American system as it exists in the ECJ. Although some member states of the OAS have 
ratified the American Convention, which is an explicit commitment to protecting and 
enforcing the rights therein, the OAS does not have enough unity to demand the direct effect 
of its laws at a national level. In spite of the absence of this doctrine, another very similar one 
was created by the IACrtHR and it can serve as an adaptation to the Inter-American context. 
It is the Duty to Punish Doctrine. 
According to Fernando Felipe Basch (2007), “the court's duty to punish doctrine not only 
governs states' international responsibility for human rights violations and victim redress in a 
traditional, compensatory approach, but also asserts that offenders must be punished. This 
approach applies to cases of grave human rights violations, as well as to every violation of 
any of the rights protected by the American Convention.”121 
The doctrine was established in Art. 2
122
 of the Convention, and declared in the very first 
contentious decision of the Court in 1988. In 1981, Manfredo Velásquez, a student at the 
National Autonomous University of Honduras, “was violently detained without a warrant for 
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his arrest by members of the National Office of Investigations (DNI) and G-2 of the Armed 
Forces of Honduras." He was accused of political crimes and subjected to “harsh 
interrogation, cruel treatment and torture.”123 Officials denied that the plaintiff had been 
detained. He was never found.  
The judgment of 1988 declared that the government of Honduras was responsible for the 
violation of the rights of personal liberty, humane treatment and life, and condemned the 
state to pay compensation to the next of kin to the victim.
124
 The Court determined that 
according to Art. 1 of the Convention, member states have the duty to ensure that the 
exercise of the rights in the convention to every person under its jurisdiction. “As a 
consequence of this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation 
of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the 
right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the 
violation.”125 The judgment was fully complied with.  
As of 2009, the duty to punish doctrine was reaffirmed in several other contentious cases 
before the IACrtHR such as Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia and Tibi 
v. Ecuador. Among such cases, Bulacio v. Argentina can be considered as the stepping stone 
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in the consolidation of the scope of the duty to punish doctrine. In 1991, the Argentine 
Federal Police conducted a massive detention of more than 80 persons around the stadium 
Club Obras Sanitárias de la Nación during a rock concert. 17 year old Walter David Bulacio 
was arrested, taken to the local police station and beaten during interrogation. He died 
because of the injuries.
126
  
The government of Argentina was declared guilty of violating the rights of life, humane 
treatment, personal liberty, child rights, fair trial and judicial protection. The Court then 
requested the state to complete an investigation, adjust domestic law to international human 
rights laws, publish the decision in its daily gazette, pay compensation for pecuniary and non 
pecuniary damages and pay for legal costs and expenses. As of 2008, the State had only 
partially complied with the order to continue investigation and change domestic laws.  
The most striking feature of this case, however, was not the change and compensation it 
brought for the victims against the state of Argentina, but the definition of the scope of the 
duty to punish doctrine. According to Basch, three main issues were clarified in Bulacio:
127
 
a) The duty to punish doctrine encompasses and is not limited to gross violations. It 
refers to every human right recognized by the Convention. 
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b) The doctrine rejects any domestic legal provision or institution which is perceived as 
an obstacle to the full exercise of human rights or that impedes the investigation and 
punishment for violations. 
c) When the rights of plaintiffs and defendant member states are in conflict, the former 
have primacy. 
The duty to punish doctrine is a variation of the direct effect doctrine, adapted to the 
American reality. Every right contained in the Convention or the other treaties establish 
human rights which are entitled to recognition and protection in the national jurisdictions. 
This is affirmed by Art. 1 of the Convention and confirmed by the duty to punish.  
 
 The IACrtHR and the Supremacy of the American Convention on Human Rights and 
treaties over national laws 
Just like the ECJ, the IACrtHR affirms that the American Convention on Human Rights and 
international treaties take precedence over domestic laws. In several decisions it not only 
explicitly declared so, but went as far as demanding that the member state adjust its 
legislation to fit international human rights standards. 
Of the 120 contentious cases decided until 2009, the Court requested member states adjust 
domestic laws to international human rights standards in 24 cases.
128
 4 of these decisions 
                                                             
128 The request to adapt domestic laws appeared in 24 judgments until 2009. The cases were (in alphabetic 
order by member state defendant): Argentina v. Bulacio (partial compliance), Argentina v. Kimel (complied), 
Chile v. Claude Reyes (complied), Chile v. The Last Temptation of Christ (complied), Chile v. Palamara (no 
compliance), Dominican Republic v. Yean and Bosico Girls (no compliance), Ecuador v. Zambrano Velez 
(complied), Guatemala v. Bacama Velasquez (no compliance), Guatemala v. Dos Erres Massacre (2009 
 59 
 
were passed in 2009 and still need time to be implemented. In 5 of the judgments, the request 
to adapt domestic legislation was fully complied with. In 2, the request was partially 
complied with. In the remaining 13, the adaptation has not occurred. 
Paniagua Morales et al. v. Guatemala was the first case in which the Court requested 
domestic legislation adaptation. It involved torture, arbitrary detention and the murder of 11 
victims who were abducted in a white van by the police during 1987 and 1988. The state of 
Guatemala was declared guilty of violating the rights to life, to humane treatment, to personal 
liberty, to a fair trial and to judicial protection. The Court requested the state to pay pecuniary 
and non pecuniary damages, investigate facts, transfer mortal remains, reimburse Court costs 
and fees and change domestic law.
129
 The Court considered that: “in accordance with Article 
2 of the Convention, Guatemala must implement in its domestic law, the legislative, 
administrative and any other kind of measures that are necessary in order to adapt 
Guatemalan legislation to the provisions of the Convention on the rights to personal liberty, 
to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees, in order to avoid cases such as this one in the 
future.”130 
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Although such adaptation of domestic law is still to be implemented,
131
 the IACrtHR 
declared that it had the power to monitor the duty of member states to adapt their legislation 
and to request it in judgments. Hitherto, there were 5 judgments which requested domestic 
law adaptation which were fully complied with. They promoted improvement in the rights of 
freedom of expression (Argentina), access to information (Chile), censorship (Chile), 
criminal procedure (Ecuador) and property rights (Nicaragua).  
As an example, on Kimel v. Argentina, the IACrtHR established a landmark precedent 
against insult laws and for freedom of expression. Eduardo Kimel, a journalist who 
specialized in the political history of Argentina, published a book called “La Massacre de 
San Patricio” revealing his research on the murder of five clergymen. A judge who was 
implicated in the case sued Kimel for libel. The journalist was convicted and sentenced by 
Fourth Court of the National Appeals Chamber for Criminal Matters to one year 
imprisonment and payment of twenty thousand pesos in damages.
132
 
Kimel presented the case before the Commission which directed it to the Court. The 
IACrtHR 2008 requested the State to remove all criminal records, reimburse legal costs and 
fees, hold a public acknowledgment of responsibility and change domestic legislation. Two 
features make this case interesting on the matter of national law adaptation: 
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a) The IACrtHR, in considering access to justice, built on a previous case it had decided 
– Castillo Petruzzi v.  Perú, and reaffirmed that “the formalities inherent to certain 
branches of domestic law do not apply under International Human Rights Law, the 
main purpose of which is the due and adequate protection of such rights.”133 Although  
Perú has still not complied with the request to its change domestic law, the Court did 
not feel intimidated in citing the case and pushing for improvement. This is evidence 
that the IACrtHR stands by its decisions and is capable of judging uniformly in spite 
of non-compliance. 
b) The Argentinean state acknowledged its failure by declaring: “the lack of sufficient 
accuracy in the criminal legislation punishing defamation and preventing the 
infringement of the right to freedom of thought and expression entails the State‟s 
failure to comply with the obligation to adopt domestic measures as provided for in 
Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights.”134 The Court then ordered 
the state to bring its domestic laws in conformity with the international human rights 
standards by eliminating the lack of accuracy with regard to defamation and libel so 
that the full exercise of the rights of freedom of thought and expression could be 
exercised.
135
 Argentina fully complied with that request.
136
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One could observe such facts and argue that changes in domestic laws happened because 
they were in the self-interest of the state. However, it is important to emphasize that the 
IACrtHR is a Court of last resort. Before cases are examined by it, they need to have 
exhausted all possible domestic avenues. A member state that was in favor of changing its 
laws would have settled with the injured parties and amended its laws before it reached the 
Inter-American Court. 
The very fact that the Court had to request the change in domestic law is evidence that the 
member state would not have done otherwise. This is a demonstration of the power of the 
Court. It did cause improvement in human rights by establishing the supremacy of the 
Convention and the Court.  
So far, this paper examined compliance, the increase in caseload, doctrines and landmark 
cases and the supremacy of the American Convention. The next part of the paper discusses 
the last proposed variable, which is the reception of judgments and doctrines of the IACrtHR 
by domestic courts. 
 
Domestic Court’s Support – the IACrtHR v. Amnesty Laws 
Monica Feria Tinta (2000) points out that “A crucial aspect of the law concerning the 
international protection of human rights is its relationship with domestic legal systems. 
Whether it is a case of domestic courts having to take into account international law in their 
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decisions or of international courts having to scrutinize domestic rulings and assess their 
fitness under international law, the relationship between national and international courts 
often does not appear to be an easy one; clashes seem unavoidable.”137 
In the case of the ECJ, member states intended to create a court which would not 
compromise their sovereignty and interests, and they attempted to retain control through 
every means possible. However, the moment that national courts started enforcing 
international jurisprudence against their own governments, those avenues no longer worked. 
138
 The same can be said about the ECHR
139
. 
So, do domestic courts in the OAS support the IACrtHR‟s decisions? Do they acknowledge 
the Court‟s right to interpret international human rights? Such questions can be answer 
positively if one can find evidence of domestic courts in the Americas citing the IACrtHR‟s 
judgments to overturn previous precedents or to declare the illegality of certain established 
laws which go against the Pact of San José.  
The confidence by which one can affirm the presence of domestic court‟s support for the 
IACrtHR is directly linked to the seriousness of the matter in question and the self interest of 
the state. If the matter is considered unimportant by the member state, the rebuttal to the 
presence of support would be that the country probably would have implemented such 
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change anyhow because the change, besides satisfying the international standard, does not 
conflict with the country‟s self interest.  
In order to avoid all of these possible counterarguments, I examine how the IACrtHR, with 
the support of domestic courts, is on the path of eliminating Amnesty Laws in the Americas. 
The choice of theme satisfies the relevance requirement because it reveals a matter that is not 
easily eliminated from domestic laws for it exposes the military and former government 
leaders to possible prosecution. For this reason, it would be hardly plausible to affirm that 
eliminating amnesties has the support of the state. 
Even if one claimed that it was within the self-interest of a newly elected government to 
punish the previous administrations for its mistakes, the fact that allowing it to happen 
through the elimination of Amnesty Laws can bring instability not only to the adversary, but 
also to the current administration.  
Domestic courts have the option to rely on the international court‟s decision or not. By doing 
so, they are recognizing its superiority. If supreme courts cite such decisions to justify a 
modification in established national precedents and laws, what would prevent future requests 
to adapt domestic laws from following the same path? In fact, once the gates of domestic 
court support have opened, it becomes difficult to justify additional changes from following 
the same path. 
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Amnesty Laws in Latin America 
The transition towards democracy is a topic which is of high interest to many authors 
focusing in the Americas. Pion-Berlin (2001) affirms that “[a]ll South American authoritarian 
regimes were military in nature. Thus transition from dictatorship meant military extrication 
from office and consequently foreshadowed a large military role in the transition particularly 
because they would be blamed for the regime‟s failures and crimes, these armed forces found 
added incentive to manipulate the transition in order to secure protection from retribution for 
themselves and their members before exiting.”140 
One of the several ways the military secured its privileges was by negotiating Amnesty 
Laws. They were passed in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,  Perú and Uruguay. Most 
were regarded as a necessary means to achieve peace and to promote understanding. What 
they actually promoted was an unjust and unreasonable protection offered to criminals and a 
blockage to the right to truth of the family members of thousands of victims of human rights 
atrocities
141
.  
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 Barrios Altos v.  Perú before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
When Alberto Fujimori became the president of  Perú in 1990, he faced the difficult tasks of 
controlling “incipient hyperinflation and massive insurrectionary violence.”142 The country 
was plagued by armed insurrections, brought by the conflict among the communist party of  
Perú – Shinning Path (“Sendero Luminoso”), the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
and the National Intelligence Service (“Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional”) represented by 
the paramilitary death squad group “La Colina.”  
Fujimori aggressively combated the guerrilla movements. In 1992, the president promoted a 
self-coup which counted with approval ratings of 82 percent of the population.
143
 According 
to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report on the conflict between guerrilla 
movements and the state, from 1980 to 2000, more than 69,280 victims were killed of which 
79 percent were peasants and 75 percent had Quechua or other native language as their 
mother tongue. The conflict also “caused enormous economic losses through the destruction 
of infrastructure and deterioration of the population‟s productive capacity, and came to 
involve the society as a whole.” 144 
One episode of such violence is the one described by the Barrios Altos v.  Perú case before 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. According to the merits judgment of the 
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Court
145
, on November 3, 1991, the residents of the poor neighborhood Barrios Altos in Lima 
were having a pollada, a party to collect funds to repair a building. At approximately 11:30 
pm, six heavily armed individuals came out of two police cars, invaded the building forcing 
residents to lie down. The individuals fired at them for about two minutes, killing 15 and 
injuring four. The attackers were later identified as belonging to La Colina, and the attack 
was considered a retaliation against the Shinning Path. 
The case would not be investigated until 1995, when prosecutor Anna Cecilia Magallanes 
accused five army officers of being responsible for the massacre. Among these officers were 
some who had already been convicted for the “La Cantuta massacre”.146 The formal 
investigation was then started by Judge Antonia Saquicuray before the Sixteenth Criminal 
Court in Lima. 
Following the indictment, a number of political and legal maneuvers blocked the prosecution. 
First, the Supreme Military Courts prevented these men and other senior military officers 
from giving statements before any judicial organ other than a military court. The military 
courts then “filed a petition before the Supreme Court claiming jurisdiction in the case, 
alleging that it related to military officers on active service.”147 
                                                             
145 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Judgment of March 14, 2001 
(Merits).” Accessed February 10, 2011. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf  
 
146 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Case of La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of November 29, 2006.” Accessed February 11, 2011. 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_162_ing.pdf  
 
147
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. “Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Judgment of March 14, 2001 
(Merits).” p. 4. Accessed February 11, 2011. 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf  
 68 
 
In 1995, even before the matter could be examined by the  Perúvian Supreme Court, Fujimori 
was reelected and passed Law 26.479 granting amnesty to all members of security forces and 
civilians undercover as a consequence of the fight against terrorism, during the period of 
May 1980 to June 14, 1995. After the president was sworn into office, he asked for a minute 
of silence and declared: “We must pacify our hearts, and forget the past and honor the 
memory of all of our deceased, because all of us, right or wrong, are  Perúvians! The amnesty 
law is necessary to build peace, and so  Perúvians must not look back but instead to the 
future.”148 
After the law was passed, Judge Saquicuray, following her constitutional imperative not to 
apply laws which are contrary to the Constitution, decided to continue with the case and 
convicted those she found responsible for the massacre. The sentence was appealed by 
defendants‟ lawyers and taken before the Lima Superior Court. Again, before the matter 
could be decided, Law 26492
149
 was passed declaring that no Amnesty Laws were to be 
revised judicially, expanding the existing protection to all members of the military, police 
and civilian officials.
150
 The sentence by the lower court judge was overturned, and the 
constitutional standing of Amnesty Laws in  Perú was affirmed. 
On June 30, 1995, the Inter-American Commission received a petition regarding the Barrios 
Altos case. On July 9, 1999, the state of  Perú deposited with the General Secretariat of the 
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Organization of the American States (OAS) a declaration of withdrawal of the recognition of 
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR), in an attempt to 
avoid having to comply with the decision of the Court in several cases being examined by it, 
including Barrios Altos.
151
 The Court affirmed that its jurisdiction had already been asserted 
and rejected the withdrawal declaring that in case  Perú decided to stand by its decision, it 
would have to denounce the whole Convention as Trinidad and Tobago did in May 26, 
1998,
152
 besides having to wait one year before such “withdrawal could take effect, for the 
sake of juridical security and continuity”153 according to Art. 68 (1) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights.  Perú would not go that far. On June 8, 2000, the Commission 
referred the Barrios Altos case to the IACrtHR. 
After such attempts to block prosecution, Fujimori fled to Japan because of a corruption 
scandal. The Congress elected Valentin Paniagua president and  Perú started a transition 
toward democracy, formally reaffirming its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the IACrtHR.
154
 
In examining the Barrios Altos case, the IACrtHR found the state to have violated the right to 
life, the right to humane treatment and the rights to a fair trial and judicial protection 
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established by the American Convention on Human Rights. In a judgment of November 30, 
2001, the Court approved the agreement on reparations accorded by  Perú and the victims, 
requested the state to pay for the healthcare expenses and education of the victims and their 
next of kin, publish part of the judgment through radio, TV and newspaper in national 
broadcast, erect a monument on behalf of the victims, publish the judgment in official 
gazette, initiate the procedure to sign and ratify the International Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes  and Crimes against Humanity, and 
most importantly, the IACrtHR declared Amnesty Laws ineffective and incompatible with 
the Convention.
155
 In fact, since the merits phase, the Court had already declared that 
Amnesty Laws lacked legal effect and could no longer continue to block investigation and 
the right to truth, and prevent justice. 
The decision will celebrate its 10
th
 anniversary this year and the case is still under 
monitoring. According to the latest examination of compliance conducted in November 20, 
2009, the state had fully complied with its obligation to acknowledge responsibility and build 
a monument; it had partly complied with the obligations to conduct criminal investigation, 
locate mortal remains, publish decision in official gazette, create education programs and pay 
compensation for pecuniary damages.
156
  
The lack of total compliance by the state of  Perú may be considered evidence of the lack of 
power of the Court to compel change. Also, the fact that the member state has not formally 
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declared its Amnesty Laws invalid can be seen as an act of defiance. However, there are four 
main effects brought by the judgment which contradict this argument. 
First, Barrios Altos v.  Perú and La Cantuta v.  Perú before the IACrtHR provoked 
international outcry to the extent of having Fujimori extradited by Chile, and prosecuted and 
convicted by the  Perúvian Supreme Court and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment for 
corruption and human rights abuses. It was the first time a democratically elected president 
had been found guilty of such crimes in his own country. Together with the former dictator, 
other military leaders and officials were sentenced for the massacres which happened during 
his administration. 
157
 
Second, the Court did not feel intimidated to cite its Barrios Altos judgment in other cases 
brought before it against  Perú.
158
 This fact was acknowledged by Samuel Abad Yupanqui, 
an expert witness in La Cantuta v.  Perú and an expert in  Perúvian constitutional Law, who 
regarded Amnesty Laws in  Perú as legally invalid. He affirmed that Barrios Altos “definitely 
opened […] the way towards justice […] in all the remaining cases.” Therefore, “the fact that 
the amnesty laws have not been formally abolished does not prevent the judges from 
investigating and punishing those held responsible, since in  Perú all judges have the 
constitutional power to give prevalence to the constitution over the laws, and consequently 
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they are authorized not to apply amnesty laws.”159 Thus, according to the Court, there is no 
need for formal removal of these laws by the state of  Perú. This is the reason why the Court 
chose to declare such laws invalid and not request the member state to do so. 
Third, Barrios Altos was cited as a precedent in decisions of the IACrtHR against other 
states. In the case of Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Amnesty law DL 2191 was passed 
on April 19, 1978 during the Pinochet years, making no distinction between common crimes 
and politically motivated crimes. It declared in its preamble that such law‟s purpose was to 
“strengthen the ties that bind Chile as a nation, leaving behind hatred that has no meaning 
today, and fostering all measures that consolidate reunification of all Chileans.”160 In this 
case, the Court followed the same line of reasoning as in the  Perúvian case to declare the 
lack of legal validity of self-amnesties.
161
 The same happened in Hilaire, Constantine, 
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Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago
162
, and more recently in Gomes Lund et al. v. 
Brazil.
163
 
In the Chilean case, amnesty laws were never formally derogated, but national courts offered 
their support for the decision of the IACrtHR. Trinidad and Tobago, as previously 
mentioned, withdrew its ratification of the Convention and its acceptance of the jurisdiction 
of the Court. In the Brazilian case, unlike any of the previous cases, the member state 
attempted to avoid the jurisdiction of the Court ratione temporis. Brazil ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights in 1992 and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 1998. The 
crimes examined by the Court which are insulated by Amnesty Laws happened during the 
dictatorship years (1964 – 1985), so technically, the Court could not adjudicate disputes 
which happened before the American Convention was ratified by the State or the jurisdiction 
of the Court was accepted. 
In the midst of the legal battle, the Brazilian Bar association requested the Brazilian Supreme 
Court to reexamine Amnesty Law 6683/79. The Supreme Court declared in April 29, 2010 
by 7 votes against 2 that it was the not up to the Judiciary to remove the law which had been 
passed in a special political context. On the same lines of justification usually traced to 
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promote and support Amnesties, this court declared that “only a superior society qualified by 
the most elevated sentiments of humanity is able to forgive.”164 
The heart of the counterargument to the ratione temporis claim and also to the decision of the 
Brazilian Supreme Court is the right to truth, recognized by the U.N. Human Rights Council 
as inalienable and essential to end impunity and promote respect for human rights in 
situations involving missing persons, forced disappearances, and other serious or gross 
human rights violations.
165
  
The Inter-American Court, in a historical ruling on November 24, 2010, declared that the 
sections of the Brazilian Amnesty Law which impede the investigation and prosecution of 
serious human rights violations are incompatible with the American Convention on Human 
Rights, lack legal effect, cannot continue to block investigation and punishment, and cannot 
have further impact on any other cases of human rights violations in Brazil.
166
 Again, the 
Court did not request the member state to act on it. It simply refused to accept the legality of 
such laws and declared them ineffective. According to the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, this decision “vindicates the families of the disappeared, civil society 
leaders and pioneering prosecutors who have affirmed for decades that the 1979 amnesty 
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cannot be interpreted as protecting military agents who committed serious human rights 
abuses.”167 
The fourth and final effect brought by the IACrtHR‟s fight against Amnesty Laws is the 
support given by domestic courts to the international judgment. In Argentina, Law 
25779/2003 nullified 2 amnesty laws known as the “full stop law” (law 23492/86) and the 
“due obedience law” (law 23521/87) which had been established to protect the military from 
being prosecuted for crimes which happened during the dictatorship.
168
 On June 14, 2005, the 
Argentine Supreme Court, by 7 votes against 1, struck down such laws by citing the Barrios 
Altos case as a legal precedent. It justified that: “The laws of full stop and due obedience 
present the same vices which led the Inter-American Court to reject the  Perúvian Laws of 
„self amnesties‟.”169  
The reliance on the jurisprudence and authority of the IACrtHR can also be found in 
Uruguayan courts. Law 15.737 of 1985 granted amnesty to all political, civil and military 
crimes committed from January 1
st
, 1962.
170
 Another amnesty law in Uruguay was law 
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15.848, known as Expiry Law or Ley de Caducidad. It established a statute of limitations for 
punishing crimes committed by the military and the police until March 1, 1985.
171
  
These laws were controversial not only legally but they also divided public opinion. There 
were two referendums consulting Uruguayans about the legitimacy of Law 15.848. The first 
on in 1989 revealed 58 percent of public approval of the law.
172
 The second one in 2009, 
received 53 percent approval.
173
 At the time of the second public consultation, José Miguel 
Vivanco, Americas director of Human Rights Watch, released a statement affirming that 
although such results were disappointing, “accountability is not a popularity contest that 
should be decided by majorities.”174 
When the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights decided to refer the case of María 
Claudia García Iruretagoyena de Gelman
175
 to the IACrtHR, the state anticipated what would 
be a decision with negative international repercussions. Despite the two referenda, on 
November 1
st
, 2010, the Uruguayan Supreme Court ruled, with the precedent of the IACrtHR 
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and the Supreme Court of Argentina, that such law was unconstitutional for blocking 
victims‟ rights to truth.176 
The Constitutional Court of Colombia also overturned amnesty laws on November 24, 2010, 
for violating the right to truth, justice and reparation.
177
 
In sum, domestic courts do offer support for the decisions of the IACrtHR. In the case of 
Amnesties, domestic courts have leaned on the power of the Inter-American Court to 
eliminate a legal error against political pressure to maintain it.  
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE IACRTHR 
 
This research focused in finding what components strengthened the ECJ and the ECHR, and 
then observing if the same features could be found in the IACrtHR. Evidence shows that the 
caseload of the Inter-American Court has been increasing significantly over the past years. 
Also, similar legal doctrines to enhance cooperation and authority can be found in the 
IACrtHR. The supremacy of the legal decisions of the Inter-American Court and the 
supremacy of the American Convention have been affirmed and established. Domestic 
support for this Court‟s decisions and opinions can be found in cases before domestic courts 
all over the Americas. 
If European courts were the creators of their own success, there is great support for the thesis 
that the Inter-American Court is on the same path, for it has the same tools to craft its 
strength. In spite of that, after observing the many characteristics of this Court and its 
relationship with member states, it is also clear that the IACrtHR has not achieved its full 
potential. This part of the paper will focus on suggestions for the improvement of the Court 
and it will be divided into 3 parts: a) the Court‟s functioning; b) access to the Court; c) the 
monitoring capacity of the Court. 
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Functioning Capacity 
The first and maybe one of the most polemic topics evolving around the effectiveness of the 
Court is related to its functioning. Tomuschat (2003) writes that the IACrtHR “has a limited 
working capacity, given the small number of judges as well as the fact that it is not a 
permanent institution.”178 
In 2009, 7 judges sat at the Court.
179
 They are elected on their individual capacity for a 
period of 6 years with the possibility of one reelection and do not receive salary for their 
work, but only a per diem and an emolument for rapporteurships.
180
  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, unlike the European Court of Human Rights, 
schedules sessions which happen according to necessity.
181
 The period of the sessions from 
1980 to 2005 has increased considerably. Until 1990, the sessions lasted on average 22 days. 
From 1991 until 2000, that number increased to 37. From 2001 to 2005, it went up to 54 
days, in 2005 breaking the record with 69 days. In 2009, the Court held 4 regular sessions 
and 3 special sessions, a total of 64 days.
182
The boost in the number of days spent during 
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session directly reflects both the complexity of the cases and mainly, the increase of the 
number of cases and requests for advisory opinions brought before it.
183
  
The need to turn the Court into a permanent body is not simply grounded on the fact that its 
European cousins are permanent. It has to do with the ability to cope with its increasing 
caseload in a proper manner. Making the Court permanently in session not only improves its 
capacity but it also represents an investment in its future functioning. 
About this issue, one of the judges of the Court, Mr. Manuel E. Ventura Robles proposes, 
inter alia, the conversion of the Court into a semi-permanent tribunal with sessions of 16 
weeks, and then, as a final stage, a permanent Court. According to him, only when this stage 
is reached there will be a true system of protection of human rights.
184
 In order to transform 
the IACrtHR into a permanent functioning body, the OAS needs to increase its funding, 
which has not been the case as Chart 5 indicates: 
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Chart 5: 
 
Source: “Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2009)”, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, p. 22, accessed February 15, 2011, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf  
The greatest disparity between the percentage increase in caseload and budget happened from 
2001 to 2005. After that, although the percentage increases do not differ that much, the gap 
between them had already been established. An increase in investment in the Court, reflected 
on the payroll of judges and other staff would pave the path to transform the IACrtHR into a 
permanent body. 
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Individual Access 
Only State parties to the Convention and the Commission can directly bring cases to the 
Court. Once again, unlike the ECJ and the ECHR, and also unlike the African Charter on 
Human and People‟s Rights of the African Union185, individuals lack the capacity according 
to the American Convention, to have direct standing in a suit in the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. 
Contrary to the position reflected in this Convention, human rights belong to the person, not 
the State neither the Commission. Rene Cassin, one of the most influential minds in the 
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in his own draft, Chapter 4, Art. 15 
recognized that “Every individual has a legal personality everywhere.”186 
It is preferable to acknowledge that individuals can submit their claims before a court under 
certain restrictions
187
, like in the case of the European Court of Human Rights, than to 
completely deny such right. Understandably, nowadays, since the Court is not permanent and 
the number of judges and officials is small, to name a few obstacles, granting individuals 
such right is a challenge. 
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Since the Court‟s Rules of Procedure entered into force in 2001, the individual has had locus 
standi in judicio
188
 or in other words, the right to participate in the proceedings. According to 
the former president of the Court, Mr. Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade (2000), granting 
individuals locus standi is not enough. They should have jus standi as well. In his words, 
“The day when we achieve this evolution, the ideal of complete juridical equality will be 
fulfilled before the Inter-American Court, between the individual as a true plaintiff, and the 
State as a defendant. Every true jus internationalist in our hemisphere has the inevitable duty 
to give his contribution to this evolution.”189 
Today‟s Inter-American system reflects the same issues that the European system did years 
ago. The increasing number of cases, the proceedings time getting longer, the lack of 
enforcement of the Court‟s decisions and its complicated structure all call for the unification 
of the jurisdiction of contentious cases under the authority of the Court. This could be 
performed within a transitional period in which the Commission would still examine cases 
brought before it, but after a while, this competency would belong only to the Court. After 
that, the Commission in the Inter-American system, unlike the one in the European system 
which was abolished, could persist with its remaining functions.  
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One could argue at this point that by doing so, just like the ECHR, the IACrtHR would 
become the “victim of its own success”, unable to effectively provide for the avalanche of 
cases brought before it.
190
 However, even if the Inter-American Court found itself in a similar 
position, the right to individual standing should not be undermined. And this ability to cope 
with an increase in caseload brought by jus standi is, once again, tied to the increase in 
investment in the Court.  
 
Monitoring Capacity  
If one is to compare judgments passed by the beginning of the activities of the Court in the 
1980‟s, to the ones passed in recent years, they will notice great changes. The Court now not 
only determines states to pay compensation, but goes further in requesting change in 
domestic legislation, public acknowledgment of responsibility and education for public 
officials. What is still common is that parts of decisions remain unfulfilled.  
It is a fact that states will struggle with complying with the Inter-American Court‟s decisions 
regardless. This is due to the fact that if they agreed with them, or did not completely oppose 
them, they would have provided the protection they failed to do in the domestic arena, or 
through an agreement before the Commission. Instead, if they fight until the ultimate level to 
avoid protecting human rights, it is because it is not within their interest to agree that they are 
guilty of violating them. 
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An interesting feature of recent decisions is that they started establishing a deadline linked to 
parts of the judgment. For example, in Gomes Lund v. Brazil, the Court ordered the state to 
allow the victims of a massacre to present their indemnization claims within the period of 6 
months. It also requested the State to, within the period of 24 months, summon the family of 
the victims to present evidence to help with the identification of the bodies.  
The obligations which are linked to a deadline usually refer to obligations of the victims or 
their family. What I would suggest is that the Court start establishing a deadline for all the 
obligations it requests a state to perform. Such policy would not be so demanding to fulfill. 
Even when the Court requests a member state to conduct investigations and punish the 
responsible ones, the maximum amount of time in which such acts can be performed 
domestically can be determined by an examination of domestic procedural codes or legal 
experts. 
Until 2009, of the 120 contentious cases submitted to the Court, 104 were still under 
monitoring. Certain cases have been under this final stage for more than a decade, even two 
decades, without closure. And unless one opens case by case, one will never know which part 
of the judgment was enforced by the state. 
Attaching a time limit to each part of the judgment would offer a more accurate picture of the 
status of compliance, inform the public and create pressure to enforce remaining orders. 
According to Art. 68 of the American Convention on Human Rights, “States Parties to the 
Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they 
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are parties.” If this provision is true, not only in theory but especially in practice, introducing 
a time limit to orders is necessary. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has still not achieved its full potential. However, 
notwithstanding the different political systems of member states, its history of human rights 
violations, its division into different economic blocks, the failures of the dual-system itself 
and innumerous other reasons for its “natural handicap”191, this research found substantial 
evidence to affirm that the IACrtHR has enough political power to defend and improve 
human rights in the Americas. 
First, compliance with the Court‟s decisions, the first variable to be examined, reveals that 
member states generally abide by obligations to apologize and offer financial compensation 
to victims, but are very reluctant to alter national laws. Domestic legislation amendment is a 
difficult goal to attain, since it requires defendant states to reduce its sovereignty on behalf of 
human rights. In spite of such unwillingness, there is great value in public apologies and the 
payment of damages which would probably not happen if it was not for the Court‟s request. 
Second, there has been a strong increase in the contentious caseload of the IACrtHR, which 
is a direct consequence of the increase in the caseload before the Inter-American 
Commission, the lack of adequate protection offered by member states and perhaps most 
important, the trust that people in the Americas have in the ability of the Court to bring 
justice.  
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Third, many of the same doctrines which are regarded as having increased the power of 
European international courts are present in the IACrtHR. The Margin of Appreciation 
doctrine offers member states the boundaries within which several measures of compliance 
would be considered acceptable. The doctrine of proportionality ascertains member states 
that in the protection of individual rights, social imperatives are taken into consideration. 
Both of these doctrines have the means to motivate obedience by offering flexibility. 
Although the doctrine of Direct Effect is not present in the IACrtHR, the Court established 
the Duty to Punish doctrine, which requires member states to punish human rights violations 
according to the Convention and its interpretation, offered by the Court.  
Fourth, just like the European international courts, the IACrtHR holds that human rights 
treaties and conventions are superior to any domestic law. Since the Inter-American Court is 
the organ responsible for the interpretation and application of the American Convention on 
Human Rights is becoming the supreme ruler on human rights matters. 
Finally, on the matter of IACrtHR v. Amnesty Laws, there is evidence of domestic courts 
support for the IACrtHR‟s rulings.  
The presence of these five variables are evidence that the IACrtHR has power to bring justice 
to human rights case. What this research demonstrated is that “deeper cooperation can come 
from little enforcement. This can occur whenever the underlying game changes in such a way 
that there is less incentive to defect from a given agreement.”192 Indeed, the public perception 
of the power of the Court, the doctrines it uses to increase its scope, the supremacy of its 
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rulings and domestic courts‟ support all combined have changed the rules of the game in the 
Americas, and the Court is gaining momentum. 
 
  
  
 
 
APPENDIX 
Contentious Case at the Stage of Monitoring Compliance until 2009 
STATE PLAINTIFF HISTORY SENTENCE LACK OF COMPLIANCE
Argentina Maqueda Dismissed
Argentina Bayarri “Mr. Bayarri was deprived of his liberty for almost 13 years 
based on a confession obtained under torture. Despite the 
fact that the Federal National Criminal and Correctional 
Appeals Chamber of Argentina found it proved that he had 
been subjected to torture, the Argentine State has not 
provided an adequate judicial response to Mr. Bayarri in 
relation to the criminal responsibility of the authors and has 
not provided any reparation for the violations
he suffered, even though 16 years have elapsed since the 
facts occurred.”
2008 (The State must pay damages, pay medical fees, conclude 
the criminal action, publish the decision in the official gazette, 
eliminate criminal records against plaintiff, train security forces 
against the use of torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment or punishment.
Argentina Bueno Alves Bueno-Alves was subjected to torture consisting
in, inter alia, beating his ears with hollowed hands, while he 
was at the police station on the
dawn of April 6, 1988, so as to force him to declare against 
himself and his lawyer, which
was informed to the judge hearing the case. As a 
consequence of the beatings, Mr. Bueno-
Alves allegedly suffered a hearing impairment of his right 
ear and the loss of his balance
function.
2007(The State must pay compensations, conduct 
investigations, publish the decision in official gazette)
Argentina Bulacio April 19, 1991, the Argentine Federal Police conducted a 
massive detention or “razzia” of “more than eighty persons” 
in the city of Buenos Aires, near the stadium Club Obras 
Sanitarias de la Nación, where a rock music concert was to be 
held. One of the detainees was Walter David Bulacio, a 
seventeen year-old, who after his detention was taken to 
the 35th Police Station, specifically to its “juvenile
detention room”. At this place, police agents beat him. He 
died because of injuries.
2003 (The State must complete investigation, adjust domestic 
law to international human rights laws, publish decision in daily 
gazette, pay compensation for pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages, pay legal costs and expenses.
2008 (The State has partially complied with the 
order to continue investigation and change 
domestic laws)
Argentina Cantos The revenue department of the province where plaintiff 
lived conducted searches in the business owned by plaintiff, 
which resulted in finantial losses. Carlos initiated several 
lawsuits, and because of them he started suffering 
persecution and harassment by state agents.  The Supreme 
Court of Argentina ruled against trial court and Cantos.
2002 (The State must lift the order of plaintiff to pay for filing 
fee, pay attorney fees, lift the attachments, encumbrances and 
other measures ordered against the properties and businesses 
of plaintiff, set supreme court fees at a reasonable amount).
2009 (The state has partially complied with the 
order to assume court fees, but has not complied 
with the order to pay fr attorney fees and set 
supreme court fees at a reasonable sum)
Argentina Garrido and Baigorria Plaintiffs taken by police and disappeared. 1996 (The State must pay for reparations, pay for court fees, 
conduct investigation, prosecution and punishment, search and 
identify the two natural children of Baigorria)
2007 (The State has not fully complied with the 
paternity investigation and the prosecution of the 
responsible ones).
Argentina Kimel Eduardo Kimel is a famous journalist who exposed failures in 
the prosecution in the murder of 5 clergymen. One of the 
judges accused by Kimel initiated criminal proceeings 
against him for libel.  Kimel was sentences to 1 year of 
imprisonment and pay damages.
2008 (The State has to remove all criminal records, reimburse 
legal costs and fees, hold a public acknoledgment of 
responsibility, change domestic legislation).
2010 (The State has not set aside the criminal 
sentence or held a public acknoledgement of 
responsibility).
TOTAL 7  
 
  
 
STATE PLAINTIFF HISTORY SENTENCE LACK OF COMPLIANCE
Barbados Boyce et al. Victims were sentenced to death without due process of 
law.
2007 (The state must commute the death sentence, adjust 
national legislation, improve conditions of detention, 
reimburse court costs and fees)
Barbados DaCosta Cadogan Victims were sentenced to death without due process of 
law.
2009 (The state must commute the death sentence, adjust 
national legislation, conduct phychiatric evaluation of accused 
ones, reimburse court costs and fes)
TOTAL 2
Bolivia Ticona Estrada Disappearance of victim conducted by Army patrol, denial of 
justice, impunity, torture, murder
2008 (The state must conduct criminal investigation, search for 
one of the victims, publish sentence in official gazette, provide 
medical and psychological care for victims, pay pecuniary and 
non pecuniary compensation)
Bolivia Ibsen Cardenas and Ibsen Pena
Bolivia Trujillo Oroza Forced disappearance, torture, murder, lack of due process 
and fair trial
2002 (The state acknoledged international responsibility during 
trial. The state must pay compensation, investigate crime, 
locate victim)
2009 (Pending compliance: locate the remains of 
victim, investigate and punish the responsible 
ones for the crime)
TOTAL 3
Brazil Nogueira de Carvalho et al Dismissed
Brazil Escher et al. Unlawful telephone interception and monitoring by State of 
Parana Military, denial of justice and proper reparation.
2009 (The state must pay non pecuniary damages, publish 
decision if official gazete, investigate the facts, pay court fees)
Brazil Garibaldi Lack of police investigation in the murder of Garibaldi at an 
extrajudicial eviction operation in Hacienda Sao Francisco in 
Parana. 
2009 (Publish sentence in official gazette, conduct investigation 
effectively, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, 
reimburse costs and expenses)
Brazil Ximenes Lopes 1999. inhuman and degrading hospitalization conditions of 
Damião Ximenes-Lopes, a person with mental illness; the 
alleged beating and attack against
the personal integrity of the alleged victim as a result of the 
action of the Officers of Casa de Reposo Guararapes 
(Guararapes Rest Home) (hereinafter “Casa de Reposo 
Guararapes” or “the hospital”); his death while held under 
psychiatric treatment; and
the alleged lack of investigation and respect for the right to a 
fair trial that derived in the impunity surrounding such case.
2006 (Investigate, publish sentence in official gazette, develop 
education and training program, pay pecuniary and non 
pecuniary damages, pay and reimburse court fees)
2010 ( The state has partially complied with the 
obligation to investigate and develop training and 
educational programs)
TOTAL 4  
9
1
 
  
 
STATE PLAINTIFF HISTORY SENTENCE LACK OF COMPLIANCE
Chile Claude Reyes et al State’s alleged refusal to provide Marcel Claude Reyes, 
Sebastián Cox Urrejola and Arturo Longton Guerrero with all 
the information they requested from the Foreign 
Investment Committee on the forestry company Trillium and 
the Río Condor Project, a deforestation project to be 
executed in
Chile’s Region XII that “c*ould+ be prejudicial to the 
environment and to the sustainable development of Chile.” 
The Commission stated that this refusal occurred without 
the State “providing any valid justification under Chilean 
law” and, supposedly, they “were not granted an effective 
judicial remedy to contest a violation of the right of access to 
information”; in addition, they “were not ensured the rights 
of access to information and to judicial protection, and there 
were no mechanisms guaranteeing the right of access to 
public information.”
The state must provide information to victims, publish decision 
in official gazette and newspaper of national circulation, adopt 
domestic law with regard to access to information, provide 
training to respond to requests on State held information, 
reimburse costs and expenses
FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Chile The Last Temptation of Christ - 
Olmedo Bustos et al
judicial censorship of the cinematographic exhibition of the 
film “The Last Temptation of Christ”, confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Chile [...] on June 17, 1997
The State must amend domestic law to eliminate censorship, 
reimburse expenses
FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Chile Almonacid Arellano Extralegal execution, failure to investigate and punish based 
on Amnesty Law.
2006 (State has to stop hindering further investigation, 
reimburse costs and expenses, publish decision)
Chile Palamara I ribarne State blocked the publication of a book about military 
intelligence, seized copies of the book, originalls, floppy 
discs, hard disc)
2005 (The state must allow the publication, restitute damages, 
publish sentence in oficial gazette, levae without effect the 
military conviction against plaintiff, annul and amend domestic 
provisions which contradict international human rights law, 
allign domestic legal system, pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages)
2009 (The State still has to take measures to annul 
and amend domestic provisions on freedom of 
thought and freedom of expression, modify 
domestic system, guarantee the due process of 
law in the military)
TOTAL 4
Colombia Manuel Cepeda Vargas
Colombia 19 Tradesmen Detention, disappearance and execution of merchants by a 
paramilitary group in 1987.
2002 (Investigate, locate victims, build a monument, organize a 
public act of acknoledgement and international responsibility, 
medicat care for next of kin, guaratee protection of witnesses, 
create environment for the return of the family from exile, pay 
pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, pay court costs and 
expenses)
2009 (The state has only complied with payments 
for minors, located the victims and reimbursed 
court costs and expenses)
Colombia Caballero Delgado and Santana Torture, imprisonment, disappearance, execution by the 
army
1995 (The state must pay pecuniary compensations, locate 
remains of victims, continue judicial prosecution, reimburse 
court costs and fees)
2009 (The state still needs to comply with the 
criminal investigation and location of victims 
remains)
Colombia Mapiripán Massacre State, deprived of their liberty, tortured, and murdered at 
least 49 civilians, after which they destroyed their bodies 
and threw their remains into the Guaviare River, in the 
Municipality of Mapiripán, Department of Meta
2005 (The state must investigate, identify victims, guarantee 
the security of the next of kin, build monument, implement 
education in human rights, publish sentence in official gazete, 
pay court costs and expenses, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages)
2009 (The state has published the decision in 
official gazette, implemented education programs 
and partially paid pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages)
Colombia Pueblo Bello Massacre Forced disappearance, extrajudicial execution, paramilitary 
groups
2006 (conduct investigation, locate and identify victims, 
medical and psychological care to victims, guarantee security of 
displaced persons, public act of apology, build monument, 
publish sentence in official gazette, pay pecuniary and non 
pecuniary damages, pay court costs and fees)
2009 (The state has just complied with the 
obligation to publicly acknowledge responsibility 
and publish sentence in official gazette)
 
9
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STATE PLAINTIFF HISTORY SENTENCE LACK OF COMPLIANCE
Colombia Ituango Massacres collaboration of law enforcement with paramilitary group, 
assassination, robbery, terror and displacement, no fair trial, 
killing
2006 (conduct investigation, provide medical care to families, 
guarantee safety of displaced persons, public 
acknowledgement, provide housing to victims, erect a plaque, 
educate the colombian armed forces, publish in official gazette, 
pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, pay court fees
2009 (The state has only complied with training 
programs of the colombian armed forces, publish 
in official gazette and paid court fees)
Colombia “La Rochela Massacre” Estrajudicial execution of civilians by paramilitary groups, 
acquiescence of state agents, murder of judicial officials 
investigating 19 tradesmen, no criminal investigation, no 
punishment
2007 (the state entered an agreement on the payment of 
reparations of victims, conduct criminal proceedings, guarantee 
the safety of judges, lawyers, law enforcement, medical and 
psychological treatment of family, promote programs of human 
rights education, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, 
build a monument, national tv transmission of details of the 
case)
2010 (The state has complied with: publish case in 
national circulation and educate colombian armed 
forces)
Colombia Escué Zapata Colombian National Army tortured and murdered the victim. 
No due process in investigations. Zapata was governor of the 
indigenous district of Jambalo.
2007 (Pay pecuniary ad non pecuniary damages, reimburse 
court fees, conduct criminal proceedings, create a fund with the 
name of the victim for the indigenous community, scholarship 
for daughter, medical, psychological and mental treatment to 
relatives, publish sentence in official gazette and in newspaper 
of national circulation,  publick acknowledge international 
responsibility)
2010 (The state has paid pecuniary and non 
pecuniary damages, reimbursed court fees, carried 
out a public act of acknowledgement)
Colombia Gutiérrez Soler Governmental officials arrested, tortured and forced the 
confession of the victim. The family was forced to exile.
2005 (The state must provide free health and psychological care 
for the family, publish sentence in daily gazette and newspaper 
of national circulation,  implement education for military and 
police, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, pay court 
fees and expenses, protect the victims and families, conduct 
criminal investigation)
2009 (the state has paid damages and reimbursed 
court fees)
Colombia Las Palmeras National police conducted armed operation with army.  They 
opened fire from a helicopter, detained and killed children, 
workers, teachers. After that, they erased evidence. 
Proceedings started but were never concluded. Nobody was 
ever charged.
2000 (complete criminal investigation, identify victims, publish 
sentence in official gazette and newspaper of national 
circulation, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, 
reimburse costs with judicial proceedings)
2010 (criminal investigations have not been 
conducted, and neither have identification of 
bodies)
Colombia Valle Jaramillo et al. Murder of jesus maria jaramillo. Other victims threatened 
and forced to exile. Members of paramilitary forces in 
connivance with the Army wanted to silence possible 
reports of human rights violations.
2008 (The State must pay damages, pay medical fees, conclude 
the criminal investigation, publish the decision in the official 
gazette, publicly acknoledge responsibility, place a plaque with 
the name of the victim, pay educational grant, guarantee the 
safety of plaintiff in case he wants to return to Colombia)
TOTAL 10
Costa Rica Herrera Ulloa criminal sentence against Ulloa for publishing accusations 
against a diplomat for commiting grave offenses in La 
Nacion. 
2004 (The state must adjust national legislation, pay non 
pecuniary damages, reimburse court fees)
2009 (The state has only paid damages and 
reimbursed court fees)
TOTAL 1
Dominican Republic Yean and Bosico Girls State failed to offer birth registration and nationality to Yean 
and Bosco children. One of the girls could not attend school 
for a year because of the lack of documents.
2005 (Publish decision in official gazette and national 
newspaper, publicly acknowledge international responsibility 
and apologize to the victims, change domestic law, pay non 
pecuniary damages, pay court costs and fees)
2009 (the state has paid non pecuniary damages 
and reimbursed court fees)
TOTAL 1  
9
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STATE PLAINTIFF HISTORY SENTENCE LACK OF COMPLIANCE
Ecuador Acosta Calderon on November 15, 1989, the Customs Military Police arrested 
Mr. Acosta Calderon, of Colombian nationality, under 
suspicion of drug trafficking. Supposedly, the statement of 
Mr. Acosta Calderon was not received by a Judge until two 
years after his detention, he was not notified of his right to 
consulate assistance, he was in custody pending trial during 
five years and a month, he was condemned on December 8, 
1994 without the alleged drugs appearing at any time, and 
he was released on July 29, 1996 for having served part of his 
sentence while he was in prison pending trial.
Publish sentence in official newspaper and other newspaper of 
national circulation, eliminate criminal record, pay pecuniary 
and non pecuniary damages and reimburse expenses)
FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Ecuador Salvador Chiriboga Inheritance issue
Ecuador Albán Cornejo et al. The State has failed to offfer access to fair trial to the 
plaintiffs who wanted to investigate their daughter`s death 
due to medication. (Medical malpractice)
2007 (The state must publish the decision in official gazette, 
divulge the rights of patients, implement education and 
ttraining in human rights, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages, reimburse court costs and expenses)
2010 (The state has only paid monetary 
compensations and reimbursements)
Ecuador Benavides Cevallos Arrest, detention, torture and muder by state agents. 1998 (pay damages, investigate and punish offenders) 2003 (The state still has to investigate the crime)
Ecuador Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo 
Íñiguez
Anti-narcotics Police officials seized a
shipment of fish belonging to the company “Mariscos 
Oreana Maror” in Guayaquil’s Simón
Bolívar Airport that was going to be sent to Miami, United 
States of America. Victims were considered  a trafficant, had 
his factory seized without a writ, victims were detained for 
too long and withour lawyers
2007 (The state must eliminate criminal records of defendants, 
eliminate private records of conviction, publicize judgments, 
pay damages, reimburse court fees, adapt internal legislation, 
disseminate judgment by tv)
2010 (the state has fully complied with the 
obligations to eliminate private records and 
change national legislation)
Ecuador Suárez Rosero Arrest, incommunicado detention and lack of due process 
and fair trial.
1999 (remove the name of plaintiff from criminal records, pay 
pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse court fees 
and costs, investigate crime)
2009 (the state failed to provide information on 
the stage of compliance, pay damages to minor 
and conduct criminal investigation)
Ecuador Tibi Arrest, detention by police withour court order, torture, 
seisure of property)
2004 (pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, acknoledge 
responsibility in newspaper, conduct criminal investigation, 
create a committee to educate state staff on human rights, 
reimburse court fees)
2009 (The state has paid pecuniary and non 
pecuniary damages and reimbursed court fees)
Ecuador Zambrano Vélez et al. Extrajudicial execution of plaintiffs by national police and 
military and no investigation)
2007 (acknowledge responsibility, publish sentence in official 
gazzete and newspaper, change domestic legislation, 
implement educational programs on human rights, reimburse 
legal costs and fees, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, 
conduct investigation)
2009 (the state still needs to comply with the 
obligation to pay pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages for families and conduct investigation)
TOTAL 8
El Salvador Serrano Cruz Sisters Capture, abduction and forced disappearance of two girls (7 
and 13) during a military operation called Operacion 
Limpeza.
2005 (Publish decision in official gazette and national 
newspaper, carry out investigation, establush commission to 
trace young children who disappeared during conflict, create a 
genetic information system, provide medical and psychological 
care, create a webpage to find disappeared persons, 
acknowledge responsibility, designate a day for the 
disappeared children, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages, reimburse court costs and fees, pay for repatriation)
2010 (the state has paid damages, reimbursed 
costs, designated a day, acknowledged 
responsibility and published in official gazette)
El Salvador García Prieto et al. murder of plaintiff, threatening of his family) 2007 (bring the pending investigation to a conclusion, publish 
sentence in official gazette and newspaper, provide medical 
and psychiatric care, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages 
anc court fees)
2010 (The state published the decision, paid 
pecuniary and non pecuniary damages and 
reimbursed court fees)
TOTAL 2  
9
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STATE PLAINTIFF HISTORY SENTENCE LACK OF COMPLIANCE
Guatemala  Chitary Nech et al
Guatemala Bámaca Velásquez Disappearance, torture, extrajudicial execution, lack of 
impartial and effective investigation)
2000 (change domstic legislation, locate mortal remains, 
investigate, publish in official gazette and newspaper, pay 
pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, pay court costs and 
expenses)
2009 (the state needs to comply with the 
obligation to change domestic legislation, locate 
mortal remains and investigate facts)
Guatemala Blake Disappearance and murder conducted by civil police in 
domestic conflict. 
1998 (The state must investigate, pay fair compensation and 
reimburse them of expenses)
2009 (The state has only reimbursed court fees)
Guatemala Carpio Nicolle et al. Politician and journalist plaintiff killed by 15 armed men. 
Other people in his staff also killed. No criminal 
investigation. 
2004 (investigate facts, remove obstacles to punishment, 
improve investigatory capacity, publish sentence, pay 
pecuniary damages, non pecuniary damages and court fees)
2009 (the state has paid damages and reimbursed 
court fees)
Guatemala Dos Erres Massacre lack of due diligence in the investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of those responsible for the massacre of 251 
inhabitants of the community (parcelamiento) of Las Dos 
Erres, la Libertad,
Department of Petén
2009 (the state must investigate facts, change domestic law, 
locate and identify bodies, create training courses in human 
rights, publish sentence, create monument, create webpage to 
search abducted childre, hold public acts, pay pecuniary, non 
pecuniary damages and court fees.
Guatemala “Street Children” (Villagrán 
Morales et al.)
Kidnapping, murder and torture of street children. 2001 (pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, change 
domestic legislation, transfer mortal remains, name 
educational center after victims, reimburse court costs and 
fees, measures of reparation)
2009 (The state has not adjusted domestic 
jurisdiction, conducted investigation)
Guatemala Fermín Ramírez Imposition of death penalty without due process or defense 2005 (hold a new trial, change criminal code of guatemala (Art. 
132), abstain from executing plaintiff, provide medical care, 
improve conditions of prisons, reimburse court expenses)
2008 (the state has reimbursed court costs, held a 
new trial and not executed plaintiff)
Guatemala Maritza Urrutia arbitrary detention and torture 2003 (investigate, pay pecuniary, non pecuniary damages and 
reimburse court fees)
2009 (the only pending item is investigation)
Guatemala Plan de Sánchez Massacre Massacre of 268 persons, intimidation and discrimination of 
family
2004 (investigate facts, publicly acknowledge resposnibility, 
translate the American Convention on Human Rights to the 
indigenous language, publish, improve infrastructure of chapel, 
provide medical treatment, provide adequate housing of 
victims, build infrastructure, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages, reimburse court costs and fees)
2009 (The state has published the sentence and 
improved the infrastrcture of chapel)
Guatemala Molina Theissen forced disappearance, extra judicial killing of minor/ child 2004 (find and deliver mortal remains, investigate facts, publish 
sentence, publicly acknowledge responsibility, name an 
educational center after the victim, expedite procedure to 
declare absence and death, create a genetic information 
system, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse 
court costs and fees)
2009 (the state has paid compensation, reimbursed 
and published)
Guatemala Myrna Mack Chang Extralegal execution, failure to investigate and punish the 
military
2003 (the state must investigate, remove legal and non legal 
obstacles, publish, publicly acknowledge responsibility, 
publicly honor life of police investigator, train courses for 
police, establish a scholarship. Name a street or square after 
victim, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse 
court fees and costs)
2009 (The state has to locate and punish Juan 
Valencia Osorio)
Guatemala Paniagua Morales et al. acts of abduction, arbitrary
detention, inhuman treatment, torture and murder 
committed by agents of the State
of Guatemala against eleven victims
1988 (pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, investigate 
facts, transfer mortal remains, change domestic law, reimburse 
court costs and fees)
2007 (The state has complied with payment of 
costs with burial of mortal remains)
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Guatemala Raxcacó Reyes imposition of a mandatory death sentence on Ronald 
Ernesto Raxcacó Reyes for the crime of kidnapping or 
abduction, for which this punishment was not
provided for by law at the time Guatemala ratified the 
American Convention; the allegedly disproportionate 
punishment imposed on him; the prison conditions in which 
he is being kept, and the alleged ineffectiveness of the 
judicial remedies filed
before the local courts
2005 (change penal code, abstain from applying the death 
penalty for those convicted of kidnapping or abduction, create 
a procedure for appeals, annull the punishment of plaintiff, 
improve prison conditions, provide medical and psychological 
care for victim, allow plaintiff to receive visits, create measures 
for the readaptation of plaintiff, publish, reimburse expenses)
2008 (the state has complied with obligation to set 
aside sentence, not execute, publish sentence, 
reimburse court expenses)
Guatemala Tiu Tojín Disappearance of victim and her daughter conducted by the 
military and civil police.  They are members of the mayan 
indigenous people. No investigation.
2008 (the state has to investigate, locate the victims, publish, 
broadcast in radio, reimburse court costs and fees)
TOTAL 13
Haiti Yvon Neptune Threats made to a politician - accused of having participated 
in a massacre
2008 (define the juridical situation of the plaintiff, regulate the 
procedures of the high court of justice, publish, improve haiti 
prisons, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages and 
reimburse court fees and costs)
TOTAL 1
Honduras Velasquez Rodrigues Manfredo Velásquez, a student at the National Autonomous 
University of Honduras, "was violently detained without a 
warrant for his arrest by members of the National Office of 
Investigations (DNI) and G-2 of the Armed Forces of 
Honduras." The detention took place in Tegucigalpa on the 
afternoon of September 12, 1981. According to the 
petitioners, several eyewitnesses reported that Manfredo 
Velásquez and others were detained and taken to the cells 
of Public Security Forces Station No. 2 located in the Barrio El 
Manchén of Tegucigalpa, where he was "accused of alleged 
political crimes and subjected to harsh interrogation and 
cruel torture." The petition added that on September 17, 
1981, Manfredo Velásquez was moved to the First Infantry 
Battalion, where the interrogation  continued, but that he 
police and security forces
denied that he had been detained
Pay compensation to next of kin FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Honduras Fairen-Garbi and Solis-Corrales on January 14, 1982, Francisco Fairén Garbi, a 28-year-old 
student and public employee, and Yolanda Solís Corrales, 
also 28 and a teacher, both Costa Rican nationals, 
disappeared in Honduras on December 11, 1981, while in 
transit through that country on their way to Mexico. It was 
also claimed that the authorities denied that the Costa 
Ricans had ever entered Honduras, whereas reports from 
the Government of Nicaragua certified their departure for 
Honduras through the Las Manos border post at 4:00 p.m. on 
December 11, 1981.
Dismissed
Honduras Godinez Cruz Saul Godínez Cruz, a schoolteacher, disappeared on July 22, 
1982 after leaving his house by motorcycle at 6:20 a.m. and 
while in route to his job at the Julia Zelaya Pre-Vocational 
Institute in Monjarás de Choluteca. The petition states that 
an eyewitness saw a man in a military uniform and two 
persons in civilian clothes arrest a person who looked like 
Godínez Cruz. They placed him and his motorcycle in a 
double-cabin vehicle without license plates. According to 
some neighbors, his house had been under surveillance, 
presumably by government agents, for some days before his 
disappearance.
Pay compensation to next of kin FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Honduras Juan H. Sánchez Kidnapping, torture and execution. 2003 (pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, investigate, 
transfer mortal remains, implement a record of detainees, 
publicly acknowledge responsibility, reimburse court costs and 
fees)
2009 ( the state has failed to pay non pecuniary 
damages, investigate facts and implement a record 
of detainees)
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Honduras Kawas Fernández murder of the president of an organization which had 
denounced human rights violations. Impunity.
2009 (pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, initiate 
criminal proceedings, publish, publicly acknowledge 
international responsibility, build a monument, provide 
psychological and psychiatric care, conduct national awareness 
and sensitivity campaign)
Honduras López Álvarez Imprisonment of victim accused of possession and illegal 
trafficking of drugs.
2006 (investigate, publish, improve conditions of prisoners, pay 
pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse court costs 
and fees)
2008 (The state has published, paid damages and 
court costs)
Honduras Servellón García et al. Inhumane and degrading conditions of prisons, attack in 
personal integrity, murder, fail to investigate
2006 (investigate, publish, publicly acknowledge, name a street 
of plaza after victims, create a program for training and 
formation of police, create a campaign for the protection of 
children and youngsters, create a unified database of crimes 
against children and youngsters, pay pecuniary and non 
pecuniary damages, reimburse court costs and fees)
2008 (the state needs to comply with the 
investigation and creating a campaign)
TOTAL 7
Mexico Alfonso Martin del Campo- 
Dodd
victim “was illegally arrested on May 30, 1992, and subjected 
to torture by agents of the Judicial Police of Mexico’s Distrito 
Federal, to make him confess that he had committed the 
double homicide of both, his sister, Patricia Martín-del-
Campo.Dodd, and his brother-in-law, Gerardo Zamudio-
Aldaba.” The Commission stated that “said confession is the 
only element supporting the sentence to 50 years in prison 
imposed by Mexico’s Judicial Authorities
Dismissed
Mexico Rosendo Cantu and other
Mexico Fernandez Ortega et al
Mexico Gonzales et al 2009 (disappearance and subsequent death” of the Mss. Claudia 
Ivette González, Esmeralda
Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez 
(hereinafter “Mss. González, Herrera and Ramos”), whose 
bodies were found in a cotton field in Ciudad Juárez on
November 6, 2001. The State is considered responsible for “the 
lack of measures for the protection of the victims, two of whom 
were minor children, the lack of prevention
of these crimes, in spite of full awareness of the existence of a 
pattern of genderrelated violence that had resulted in 
hundreds of women and girls murdered, the lack of response of 
the authorities to the disappearance *…+; the lack of due 
diligence in the investigation of the homicides *…+, as well as 
the denial of justice and the lack of an
adequate reparation)
Mexico Campo Algodonero Provisional Measures
Mexico Castañeda Gutman Inexistence in the domestic sphere of a simple and effective 
remedy to claim the constitutionality of political rights and 
the consequent impediment for Jorge Castañeda Gutman 
*…+ to register his independent candidacy for the presidency 
of Mexico” in the elections held in July 2006.
2008 (The state must adapt its domestic law, publish sentence 
in official gazete, reimburse court costs and expenses)
2009 (The state has not adjusted domestic 
jurisdiction)
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Mexico Radilla Pacheco Forced disappearance of victim caused by members of the 
army
2009 (conduct investigation, locate remains of victims, change 
domestic legislation, implement education on the limits of 
military jurisdiction and the IACrtHR, publish, publicly 
acknowledge responsibility, prepare a bibliographical sketch of 
victim, provide free psychological and psychiatric care, pay 
pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse court costs 
and fees)
TOTAL 4
Nicaragua Genie-Lacayo at approximately 8:35 in the evening of October 28, 1990, the 
youth Jean Paul Genie-Lacayo, age
16, resident of the city of Managua, was traveling by car to 
his home in the Las Colinas subdivision. After having 
stopped at a restaurant, he took the road to Masaya and 
between kilometers 7 and 8 he came upon a convoy of 
vehicles transporting military personnel who, in response to 
his attempts to pass them, fired their weapons at him. The 
victim did not die immediately but was abandoned on the 
highway and died from hypovolemic shock
Pay compensation to next of kin FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Nicaragua Mayagna Sumo Awas Tingni 
Community
Community protested the possibility of a concession on its 
lands being granted to Sol del Caribe S.A. (SOLCARSA), 
without it previously having been consulted; the State, 
through MARENA, granted a 30-year concession to SOLCARSA 
to exploit approximately 62,000 hectares of tropical forest in 
the Atlantic coast region on land claimed by the Community
The state must adopt domestic law, grant property rights to the 
community, pay non pecuniary damages and reimburse
FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Nicaragua YATAMA Indigenous candidates prohibited from participating in 
municipal elections.
2005 (publish, publish in official website, broadcast in radio 
station, reform recourse system to supreme court, reform 
electoral act, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, 
reimburse court fees and costs)
2010 (state has complied with the obligation to 
publish, publish in official website, and only 
partial with payments)
TOTAL 3
Panama Baena Ricardo et al. 270 government employees who had participated in a 
demonstration for labour rights, and who were
accused of complicity for perpetrating a military coup, were 
arbitrarily dismissed. No due process.
1999 (pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reinstate the 
workers)
2010 (individual payments still pending)
Panama Heliodoro Portugal Disappearance, torture, extrajudicial execution, lack of 
impartial and effective investigation)
2008 (pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, investigate, 
publish, public acknowledge, medical care. Define the crimes 
of torture and forced disappearance, reimbursement of court 
costs and fees)
2010 (the state still needs to investigate, provide 
medical care and define offfenses)
Panama Tristán Donoso Tristan donoso, a lawyer, had a conversation wiretapped, 
recorded and disclosed. He was convicted for defamation.
2009 (pay non pecuniary damages, set aside criminal 
investigations, publish, reimburse court costs and fees)
FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
TOTAL 3
Paraguay Ricardo Canese during the electoral debates leading up to the 1993 
Paraguayan presidential elections, Ricardo Canese 
questioned the suitability and integrity of Juan Carlos 
Wasmosy, who was also a presidential candidate, when he 
stated that the latter “was the Stro*e+ssner family’s front 
man in
CONEMPA” (Paraguayan Building Companies Consortium) 
(hereinafter “CONEMPA”), a company that took part in 
developing the Itaipú bi-national hydroelectric initiative, 
and whose President, at the time when the statements were 
made, was Mr. Wasmosy. The statements were published in 
several Paraguayan newspapers. The Commission indicated 
that, as a result of these statements and based on a 
complaint filed by some members of CONEMPA, who had 
not been named in the statements, Mr. Canese was tried, 
sentenced in first instance on March 22, 1994, and sentenced 
in second instance on November 4, 1997, for the offenses of 
slander to two months’
imprisonment and a fine of 2,909,000 guaranís
The state has to pay non pecuniary damages, reimburse 
expenses, publish sentence in Official Gazette and another 
newspaper
FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
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Paraguay XÁKMOK KÁSEK
Paraguay Sawhoyamaxa I ndigenous 
Community
property rights of the indigenous community, nutritional, 
medical and health care.
2006 (publication, property rights to the community within 3 
years, community development fund, pay non pecuniary 
compensation, reimburse court costs and fees, while landless 
the state must provide basic supplies for survival, install 
communication system, registration and documentation 
program, change domestic laws)
2008 (the state has partially complied with 
payments, registration program and publication)
Paraguay Yakye Axa I ndigenous 
Community
property rights of the indigenous community, nutritional, 
medical and health care.
2005 (grant property rights, provide basic services for the 
members of the community as long as they remain landles, set 
up a fund for the purchase of land, implement community 
development program, publish, publicly aclnowledgement, 
change domestic legislation, pay pecuniary damages and 
reimburse court costs and fees)
2008 (The state has complied with the obligation to 
publicly acknowledge responsibility and partially 
paid compesation and reimbursement)
Paraguay Goiburú et al. Illegal and arbitrary detention, torture and forced 
disappearance of plaintiffs by sttate agents.
2006 (the state must investigate, locate bodies, publicly 
acknowledge responsibility, publish, medical treatment to 
family, build monument, implement permanent programs of 
human rights, define torture and involuntary disappearance, 
pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse costs 
with court)
2009 (the state has published, implemented 
educational programs and reimbursed court costs)
Paraguay Juvenile Reeducation Institute Death of minors at a Juvenile institute due to fire, bullet 
wound, injuries and smoke inhalation. Overpopulation, 
overcrowding, lack of sanitation, inadequate infrastructure, 
and a prison guard staff that was both too small and poorly 
trained. 
2004 (The state must publish judgement on oficial gazette, carry 
out an act of public acknoledgement of international 
responsibility, provide psychological treatment, vocational 
guidance and special eucation programmes, ensure protection 
to witnesses, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, 
reimburse court costs and fees)
2009 (The state has only published the sentence on 
official gazete).
Paraguay Vargas Areco Minor recruited to military service, failed to return after 
Christmas, ran to fllee pun ishment after being treated for 
nose bleeding, was shot on the back.
2006 (investigate, public apology and acknoledgement, provide 
medical, psychological and psychiatric treatment for family, 
publish, change domestic legislation on the recruitment of 
minors, pay pecuniary damages, non pecuniary damages and 
court costs and fees)
2008 (The state has partially complied with the 
obligations to pay damages, reimburse, adapt 
domestic legislation, publish, created educational 
programs)
TOTAL 6
Peru Cayara extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detention, forced 
disappearance of persons and damages against public 
property and the property of Peruvian citizens, who were 
victims of the actions of members of the Peruvian army, 
beginning on May 14, 1988 in the District of Cayara, Province 
of Victor Fajardo, Department of Ayacucho
Dismissed
Peru Acevedo Buendía et al. 
(“Dismissed and Retired 
Employees of the 
Comptroller’s Office”)
Failure to pay salaries and wages, benefits, and bonuses 
received by the active employees of that office performing 
functions identical, similar, or equivalent to those that the 
discharged or retired
employees performed”, regarding the two hundred and 
seventy-three [273] members of the Association of 
Discharged or Retired Employees of the Comptroller General 
of the Republic
2009 (pay pecuniary, non pecuniary damages, reimburse court 
costs and fees, comply with the order of the constitutional 
court of Peru, publish)
Peru Acevedo Jaramillo et al. Employees dismissed because they participated in a strike, 
without pay.
2006 (reinstate workers, pay compensation for lost wages, pay 
pension, retirement, social security, non pecuniary damages, 
reimburse court costs and fees, provide legal counselling to 
victims)
2009 (all reinstatement and other points under 
execution by national courts)
Peru Anzualdo Castro Forced disappearance, possible execution and destruction of 
body.
2009 (conduct criminal proceedigs, search body, make efforts to 
locate persons disappeared during internal conflict, change 
legislation, implement education, publish, acknowledge 
responsibility, erect a plaque, provide health care to family, 
pay pecuniary, non pecuniary damages and reimburse court 
costs and fees)  
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Peru Baldeón García Military forces arrested victim during church service in 
community. He was a farmer. They tied him upside down, 
whipped and submerged him in water tanks
2006 (investigate, publish, public apology, acknowledge 
responsibility, name street park or school after victim, pay 
medical care for family, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages, reimburse court costs and fees)
2009 (The state has only fully complied with the 
obligation to publish and name a street, park or 
school after victim. The state has partially provided 
medical care)
Peru Barrios Altos Nov. 3, 1991: poor lima neighborhood Barrios Altos organize 
to make a fundraiser (pollada) to help replace pipes and 
drains that were making their children sick; 11:30 pm 6 
masked men come out of a vehicle; they fire silencers in the 
crown, killing 15 including an 8 year old child running to his 
father`s aid; 4 people seriously wounded.
2001 (The state has to remove Amnesty Laws, pay damages, 
provide scholarships and free health care to the victims, change 
domestic law, build a monument, publish the case through all 
channels of media available)
2009 (Fujimori`s imprisonment, the state has paid 
damages, court fees, but the court needs more 
information on compliance with regard to the 
other topics)
Peru Cantoral Benavides Detention and torture of victim by army. Accusation of 
terrorism. Faceless tribunal.
2001 (pay pecuniary damages, non pecuniary damages, court 
costs and fees, revert conviction, nullify any condemnation 
against plaintiff, provide fellowship, publish, provide medical 
treatment, investigate)
2009 (the state still needs to fullfil its obligation to 
provide scholarship, provide medical care, conduct 
investigation)
Peru Cantoral Huamaní and García 
Santa Cruz
Kidnapping, torture and execution by army 2007 (investigate, publish, publicly acknowledge responsibility, 
provide study grant, provide psychological treatment, pay 
pecuniary non pecuniary and reimburse)
2009 (the state has only partially complied with its 
obligation to pay some compensation)
Peru Castillo Páez abduction and disappearance by police 1998 (pay damages, investigate, reimburse court costs and fees, 
locate remains)
2009 (the state still needs to locate remains)
Peru Castillo Petruzzi et al. Plaintiffs prosecuted in military court and convicted of 
treason. Sentenced to life imprisonment.
1999 (change domestic law, reimburse court costs and fees) 1999 (no compliance)
Peru Cesti Hurtado Arrest and judgment by the military depriving victim of 
liberty in spite of habeas corpus.
2001 (annul military proceedings, pay pecuniary and non 
pecuniary damages, reimburse court costs and fees, investigate 
facts)
2010 (the state has only reimbursed court costs and 
fees)
Peru “The Five Pensioners” non-compliance with the judgments of the Supreme Court 
of Justice and the Constitutional Court of Peru “that ordered 
the organs of the Peruvian State to pay the pensioners a 
pension in an amount calculated as established in the 
legislation in force when they began to enjoy a determined 
pension regime
2003 (right to property should be determined by national 
courts, investigate, pay non pecniary damages, reimburse court 
costs and fees)
2006 (the state has only reimbursed)
Peru De La Cruz Flores Detention, judgment by faceless judge, convicted of crime 
of terrorism)
2004 (conduct new trial with due process, pay pecuniary 
damages, non pecuniary damages, medical care, reinstate 
victim, offer her a grant, register in retirement, publish, 
reimburse)
2010 (The state has published and paid)
Peru Miguel Castro Castro Prison cruel, inhumane and drgrading treatment to inmates 2006 (investigate, guarantee the delivery of remains to family, 
return the remains of inmates to families, publick act of 
acknowledgement, public apology, medical care, education 
program, monument, publish, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages, reimburse court costs and fees)
2009 (State has failed to provide information. The 
court will keep proceedings of monitoring open)
Peru Constitutional Court Fujimori dissolved congress and court in 92. They returned 
later, and were harassed and threatened. Some justices 
were removed. 
2001 (investigate human rights violations, pay arrears of 
salaries and other benefits, reimburse costs and expenses)
2008 (the state has paid arrears but not interest)
Peru Durand and Ugarte Detention of victims, accusation of terrorism, incarceration, 
riots in many prisons, many wounded and dead inmates.
2001 (pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, provide 
health care, apologize to victims, publish, locate remains, 
investigation)
2008 (the state has fully complied with the 
obligation to apologize)
Peru García Asto and Ramírez Rojas Detention by police with no arrest warrant or flagrante 
delicto. Judgment conducted by faceless judge, convicted of 
the crime of terrorism.
2005 (provide free medical care, provide scholarships, pay 
pecuniary, non pecuniary damages and reimburse court costs 
and fees, publish)
2007 (No information by the state. Proceedings 
open)
Peru Gómez Palomino Forced disappearance and murder 2005 (investigatem locate remains, publish, provide medical 
care, education program, change legislation, pay pecuniary and 
non pecuniary damages and reimburse court costs and fees)
2009 (The state has partially complied with 
publication, payment of damages and 
reimbursements)
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Peru Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers detention, torture and execution of minor brothers by 
police.
2004 (investigate, publicly acknowledge, apologize, publish, 
name a school after victims, provide scholarship to family, pay 
pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse costs and 
expenses, register daughter of victim)
2008 (the state has named an education center and 
registered daughter)
Peru Huilca Tecse Extrajudicial execution of trade union leader by Death squad 
Colina
2005 (investigate, public acknowledgement, publish, create a 
course on human rights and labor law under the name of victim, 
celebrate the work of victim in 1 may celebrations, erect a bust, 
provide medical care, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary 
damages)
2006 (the state has published, publicly 
acknowledged responsibility and paid damages)
Peru Ivcher Bronstein Bronstein was president of Channel 2. He denounced grave 
human rights violations and corruption and was removed 
from editorial control.
2001 (The state must should investigate, identify and punish 
the responsible ones, reinstate Bronstein as shareholder of the 
channel, pay moral damages, reimburse court costs and 
expenses)
2009 (The state has only paid compensations and 
reimbursements)
Peru La Cantuta Invasion of Universidad Enrique Guzman y Valle, 10 captured 
and taken to Boca del Diablo where they were executed and 
buried; Newspaper repercussion; no information given to 
families; dean and families file 3 habeas corpus which were 
dismissed as groundless; criminal complaints filed by family 
in 1992; Henry Pease Garcia, a progressive congressman, 
receives Leon Dormido; congressional committee is formed; 
military tanks stationed near the congress; In 1993, Peruvian 
General Rodolfo Robles Espinoza links La Cantuta to La 
Colina (exiled); Newspaper Si receives a hand drawn map 
with location of bodies;
2006 (The state must conduct and complete criminal 
investigations, locate mortal remains, build a memorial, 
publish decision in oficial gazette, provide health care to family 
members, human rights education for members of the Armed 
Forces, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse 
court costs, publicly acknoledge its liability)
2009 (The state has fully complied with its 
obligation to acknowledgeliability and built a 
monument; It has partly complied with 
investigation, location of mortal remains, publish 
decision in official gazete, created education 
programs and paid compensation for pecuniary 
damages)
Peru Loayza Tamayo Arrest, torture, cruel an inhumane treatment, violation of 
judicial guarantees
1998 (reinstate plaintiff to teaching, guarantee retirement 
benefits, nullify judicial decisions against her, pay pecuniary 
and non pecuniary, change terrorism laws and treason laws, 
investigate, pay court costs and fees, publicly acknowledge 
responsibility)
2008 (the state paid damages and court costs and 
fees)
Peru Lori Berenson Mejía Accusation of terrorism, imprisonment, violation of judicial 
guarantees
2004 (adapt domestic legislation, publish, medica; care, forgive 
civil debt, improve prison, pay pecuniary damages, reimburse 
court costs and fees)
2006 (the state has forgive civil debt, published 
and reimbursed court costs and fees)
Peru Neira Alegría et al. Detention, accusation of terrorism, riots 1996 (pay compensations, create trust funds, locate remains, 
publicly acknowledge responsibility)
2009 (reparations are pending compliance)
Peru Dismissed Congressional 
Employees
Dismissal of 257 employees from the Congress 2006 (conduct trial to analyse the dismissal, pay non pecuniary 
damages, reimburse court costs and fees)
2009 (the state needs to pay damages and conduct 
trial)
TOTAL 26
Suriname Aloeboetoe et al In Atjoni, more than 20 male, unarmed maroons 
(bushnegroes) were beaten with rifle-butts by soldiers who 
had detained them under suspicion that they were members 
of the Jungle Commando. Some of them were seriously 
wounded with bayonets and knives. They were forced to lie 
face-down on the ground while the soldiers stepped on 
their backs and urinated on them
The state must pay non pecuniary compensation, create two 
trust funds, reimburse expenses of the foudnation, reopen 
school, make medical facility operational
FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Suriname Gangaram-Panday Mr. Asok Gangaram Panday was detained by the
Military Police when he arrived at Zanderij Airport in 
Paramaribo. The Military Police at Fort Zeeland, where he 
was detained, subsequently reported that he had hanged
himself.
The state must pay compensation to the widow and his children FULL COMPLIANCE!!!
Suriname Moiwana Community Massacre of 40 men, women and children by armed forces. 
Exhile or internal displacement of survivors.
2006 (investigate, locate remains, guarantee property rights, 
establish a community fund, acknowledge international 
responsibility, apologize, build memorial, build pecuniary and 
non pecuniary damages, reimburse court costs and fees, 
guarantee safety of people who decide to return)
2007 (The state has publicly acknowledged 
responsibility, paid damages and reimbursed court 
costs and fees)
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Suriname Saramaka People Failure to recognize the juridical personality of the Saramaka 
People. Construction of a hydroelectrc plant, flooding of 
their land.
2007 (grant property rights, grant legal recognition, change 
legislation, consult people in every decision involving their 
land, minimize environmental damage, translate into Dutch 
and publish, pay compensation, reimburse court costs and 
funds)
2010 (no information)
TOTAL 4
Trinidad and Tobago Caesar Plaintiff suffered corporal punishment (allowed by domestic 
legislation), was not tried within reasonable time
2005 (pay moral damages, health care, abrogate corporal 
punishment act, amend constitution, improve prison, pay 
pecuniary and non pecuniary damages)
2007 (The state denouced the convention, and the 
IACrtHR declared that it still needs to comply)
Trinidad and Tobago Hilaire, Constantine, Benjamin 
et al.
"mandatory nature of the death penalty"; the process for 
granting amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence in 
Trinidad and Tobago; the delays in certain alleged victims’ 
criminal proceedings; the deficiencies in the treatment and 
conditions of detention of certain alleged victims; the due 
process
violations during some of the alleged victims’ pre-trial, trial 
and appeal phases; and finally, for certain alleged victims, 
the denial of access to legal aid for the purpose of pursuing 
domestic remedies for the violations of their rights
2002 (conduct a retrial according to new criminal law, abstain 
from executing plaintiffs, pay non pecuniary damages, improve 
prison, reimburse expenses)
2003 (The state refused to comply and a report was 
sent to the OAS.)
TOTAL 2
Venezuela Apitz Barbera et al. Removal of judges from office - accusation that they made a 
mistake in analyzing law
2008 (pay damages, reimburse, reinstate positions, publish, 
pass a judicial code of ethics)
2009 (No information from state)
Venezuela Barreto Leiva Plaintiff, former director general of the office of the 
president, was dismissed and convicted  for crime against 
property. No due process. 
2009 (grant the plaintiff the change to appeal, adapt domestic 
legal system, publish, pay non pecuniary damages and 
reimburse expenses)
Venezuela Blanco Romero et al. Plaintiffs had their homes invaded by DISIP officers, were hit 
and taken. Disappearance.
2005 (investigate, locate, publish, change legislation to 
accommodate habeas corpus, reform criminal laws, educational 
and training courses, facilitate minor`s department from 
Venezuelam pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, 
reimburse expenses)
2009 (The state has done NOTHING)
Venezuela El Caracazo extrajudicial execution of 35 persons, the disappearance of 
two persons and the injuries to three during the events of 
February and March 1989
2002 (investigate, locate remains, pay for burial, educate, 
adjust public operations against disturbances, physical means 
to tame disturbances under control, publish, pay pecuniary 
damages, non pecuniary damages, reimburse court costs and 
fees)
2009 (the state has reimbursed expenses and paid 
damages)
Venezuela El Amparo 16 fishermen travelling were stopped by the military, and 14 
were killed - operation Anguilla III
1997 (pay reparations, create trust fund, investigate) 2010 (the state still needs to investigate)
Venezuela Montero Aranguren et al. extrajudicial execution of 37 detainees at the Detention 
Center of Catia, located in the city of Caracas, Venezuela, at 
dawn, on November 27, 1992. These facts might have 
occurred after the second attempt of a coup d’etat in 
Venezuela
2006 (investigate, locate remains, change domestic laws, 
improve prisons, educate, publicly acknowledge international 
responsibility and ask for forgiveness, publish, pay pecuniary 
and non pecuniary damages, reimburse expenses)
2009 (the state has done NOTHING)
 
1
0
2
 
  
 
STATE PLAINTIFF HISTORY SENTENCE LACK OF COMPLIANCE
Venezuela Perozo et al. statements made by public officers, acts of harassment and 
physical and verbal assault, as well as hindrance to 
broadcast, committed by State agents and private 
individuals, to the detriment of forty-four (44) people 
associated with Globovisión television station
2009 (conduct investigation, publish, remove impediments to 
dreedom of information, reimburse costs and expenses)
Venezuela Reverón Trujillo arbirtrary dismissal from judicial position 2009 (reinstate victim, remove dismissal from file, approve 
ethics code, change domestic legislation, publish, pay 
pecuniary, non pecuniary and reimburse)
Venezuela Ríos et al. 20 people, all of them journalists or social communication 
workers that are or have been linked to RCTV, subject to 
several threats, acts of harassment, and verbal and physical 
abuse, including injuries caused by gunshots, and that there 
were attempts against the installations of the RCTV 
television station
2009 (investigate, publish, eliminate impediments to freedom 
of information, reimburse costs and fees)
Venezuela Usón Ramírez “filing of a criminal action before the military court due to 
the crime of Slander against the National
Armed Forces, to the detriment of Retired General Francisco 
Usón Ramírez *…+ and the subsequent judgment of 
deprivation of liberty for five years and six months as a 
consequence of certain [alleged] statements that Mr. Usón 
made in a television interview
2009 (leave criminal trial without effect, limit competence of 
military tribunals, change organic code of military justice, 
publish, pay pecuniary and non pecuniary damages, reimburse 
court costs and expenses)
TOTAL 10
1
0
3
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